# 1NC

### 1

#### *They engage with a human rights violator - Moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 2

#### TPA will pass—PC key

Parnes, 1/21 (Amie, 1/21/2014, “Obama: Give me fast track trade,” <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/195858-white-house-works-to-convince-dems-to-give-obama-fast-track-on-trade>))

The White House is making a major push to convince Congress to give the president trade promotion authority (TPA), which would make it easier for President Obama to negotiate pacts with other countries.

A flurry of meetings has taken place in recent days since legislation was introduced to give the president the authority, with U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman meeting with approximately 70 lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate.

White House chief of staff Denis McDonough has also been placing calls and meeting with top Democratic lawmakers in recent days to discuss trade and other issues.

Republicans have noticed a change in the administration’s interest in the issue, which is expected to be a part of Obama’s State of the Union address in one week.

While there was “a lack of engagement,” as one senior Republican aide put it, there is now a new energy from the White House since the bill dropped.

The effort to get Congress to grant Obama trade promotion authority comes as the White House seeks to complete trade deals with the European Union, and a group of Asian and Latin American countries as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP.

The authority would put time limits on congressional consideration of those deals and prevent the deals from being amended by Congress. That would give the administration more leverage with trading partners in its negotiations.

The trade push dovetails with the administration’s efforts to raise the issue of income inequality ahead of the 2014 midterm elections. The White House is pressing Republicans to raise the minimum wage and extend federal unemployment benefits.

The difference is, on the minimum wage hike and unemployment issue, Obama has willing partners in congressional Democrats and unions, who are more skeptical of free trade. Republicans are more the willing partner on backing trade promotion authority.

Legislation introduced last week to give Obama trade promotion authority was sponsored by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp (R-Mich.) and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.), as well as Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking member on Finance.

No House Democrats are co-sponsoring the bill, however, and Rep. Sandy Levin (D-Mich.), the Ways and Means Committee ranking member, and Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), the panel’s former chairman, have both criticized it. They said the legislation doesn’t give enough leverage and power to Congress during trade negotiations.

Getting TPA passed would be a major victory for the administration, and one that would please business groups, but the White House will first have to convince Democrats to go along with it.

One senior administration official said the White House has been in dialogue with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle “with a real focus on Democrats” to explain TPA and take into account their concerns.

“Any trade matter presents challenges,” the senior administration official said, adding that White House officials are “devoted” to working with members on the issue.

The Democratic opposition makes it highly unlikely the trade promotion authority bill, in its current form at least, will go anywhere.

One big problem is that it was negotiated by Baucus, who is about to leave the Senate to become ambassador to China.

Baucus will be replaced by Sen. Ron Wyden (Ore.), who is said to disagree with the approach taken by his predecessor. Democratic aides predict the legislation, which Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) called “controversial” last week, would have to be completely redone to gain traction among lawmakers in their party.

Some Democrats might see a disconnect between the White House’s push for trade and it’s separate push on income inequality, which has been embraced by the party.

But that doesn’t mean the White House won’t ramp up their focus on trade in the coming weeks and months.

Senior congressional aides expect trade to be a part of Obama’s upcoming State of the Union address, since the White House has made clear that the trade bill is a priority and the TPP trade pact is a core part of the administration’s overall jobs agenda, in terms of increasing exports and opening markets.

“This is a priority of the president's,” White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters last week. “It's part of a broad approach to expanding exports and, you know, creating more opportunities for our businesses to grow. And we're going to continue to push for it.”

In the same vein, House Republicans will continue to increase pressure on the administration to get Democrats on board.

“The White House carries the weight on this,” one senior House aide said.

#### the plan destroys obama’s agenda and the link turns the case

LeoGrande, 12 William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Passing TPA is critical to the future viability of the WTO – which will collapse now.

Jeffrey Schott 6/14/13 Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics Payoff from the World Trade Agenda

Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC

June 14, 2013 http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/transcript-20130614.pdf

Now, what are the prospects for Bali? Well, they’re not so good. Trade ministers are prone to accentuate the positive. But when APEC trade leaders met in Surabaya, Indonesia in April of this year, they admitted, and I need to quote this. This is what they said: “The negotiation as it stands now is not on course to lead to a successful outcome at the Ministerial Conference 9 in Bali.” And then even more ominously they said: “The continued viability of the WTO’s negotiating function is at serious risk.” So that’s what our trade leaders, our optimistic trade leaders are saying about the prospects for moving forward later this year in Bali. And it underscores the task that Terry and others have. And it has to be more than the business community, but as Fred said it has to be certainly pushed hard by the business community to just get the officials and the negotiators to recognize that there’s a lot at stake and a big window of opportunity to make progress, but a big cost if they don’t. Now, what are the reasons for the impasse? And this is something that goes beyond what we put in our study. It’s more of a postscript to our study to look at the task going forward. And there are a number of problems that beset the preparations for the Bali Ministerial. You can call them Bali aches if you like. Oh, yeah, I was wondering whether to say that, and obviously I shouldn’t have. The first is issue with linkages. These are tactical gambits that risk blocking agreement like similar moves blocked agreement on the overall DOHA agenda over the past 10 years. And the key problem going forward for Bali is linking what is called food security subsidies with the trade facilitation agreement. There are important issues with regard to food security. There are important issues with regard to agricultural subsidies. But they should not be used in a way that blocks the ability to get the big deliverable out of Bali. And negotiators are still tied up in knots on how to do that. The second problem regards imbalances. Each country has a different idea of what is a balanced accord. Now, the terminology is important. In the past, we talked in trade negotiations about reciprocity. Reciprocity is an ambiguous term, but it’s a lot clearer than talking about balanced because each country hastheir own idea of what balanced is and there’s no consistent standard to set it on. So the first imbalance derives from differences in how countries value the benefit of policy change, basically taking what’s going on now and changing what countries do in order to open up more opportunities from trade and investment and how they value the increase in policy predictability that comes when new obligations constrain the ability of governments to reverse liberalization and to add new protectionism. So those are important. How do you value those things? In fact, the appreciation of the value of those two aspects is sometimes not well understood. The second imbalance comes between the level of progress that is needed on market access across agriculture and manufacturing and services, and the progress on commitments to new rule-making obligations, which often also encompass reforms that result in improved market access. This is part of the problem with the duty-free, quota-free issue and the resistance to going to a 100 percent coverage of tariff lines in a number of countries. There needs to be progress both on the coverage of the tariff preferences for the least developed countries. But there also needs to be progress on the eligibility rules for qualifying for the preferential rates. I mean, there are some countries that provide a 100 percent duty-free, quota-free treatment for least developed countries, but those countries don’t get access to that market because the eligibility rules, the content requirements and the like, basically block them from access to those markets. So those two things have to be done. There has to be a greater liberalization of the eligibility requirements to make those LDC preferences meaningful. And third, there are leadership lapses. And this has been throughout the DOHA Round, so this is nothing new. The big players, developed and developing, need to put their chips on the table. For the U.S. and the EU, this means real constraints on farm supports and real new access for the exports of the least developed countries. These countries should be more responsive with regards to cuts of agricultural export subsidies—that’s one of our initiatives in our study. And indeed, there has been suggestions for 16 Bali that developing countries want the U.S. and Europe to commit to a 50 percent down payment on reductions of agricultural export subsidies, but that’s actually doable given the current climate of high commodity prices and should be acceptable if the deal included a snapback clause. But it seems to be resisted so far. And this is one area where the negotiators are being a bit too risk-averse. For China, it means dropping the charade that they are recently a ceded member to the WTO, and therefore, don’t have to do anymore. They need to do more. They need to commit to broader liberalization than other developing countries. And they have the ability to do that. For all the BRICs, it means advancing services negotiations as a means to unblock the negotiating impasse on agriculture and on NAMA. Now, this audience probably is focusing on, well, how the heck is the United States going to do in any of this. And it leads to the question of what about trade promotion authority. For the U.S., passage of new trade promotion authority would send a very positive signal that we were willing and able to make these commitments and follow through on them, and it should be done soon. And I was pleased that Mike Froman in these confirmation hearings gave the committee assurances that he would work closely with the Finance and Ways and Means Committee that are already doing preparatory work on new legislation. Now, soon in this context given legislative realities means that a bill should be either passed or at least well advanced before Bali. I think if there’s a clear sign that the Congress is moving forward and will enact trade promotion authority that this will make it easier for the U.S. negotiators to put together the type of deal that serves our broad interest and those of the trading system. But, passage of the farm bill could send exactly the opposite signal, at least the way it is being considered right now and if key Senate provisions are enacted. It’s interesting that legislators hardly take into consideration at all international trade negotiations when they put together a farm bill. And while they should deal with the concerns of their constituents, their constituents are operating in global markets. And it’s interesting that while there’s interesting cutting subsidies in the Congress, the subsidies that they’re considering cutting are the only ones that are actually legal under the WTO system. So they’re cutting the legal subsidies and proposing new subsidies that would, if not be illegal, would be actionable and considered trade distorting under the WTO. So this is a problem and for Bali, if Congress doesn’t act on the farm bill, that may be a positive thing. So in sum, I think what has come out of our study is that there are a lot of important things that should and can be done. A Bali deal is critical to rebuilding confidence in WTO negotiations. And simply put, officials need to demonstrate that WTO talks can produce results. That used to be why everyone went to Geneva during the GATT era. But there has been a great deal of skepticism in recent years that negotiators recognized the urgency of getting something done. And second, Bali needs to produce a solid down payment on a bigger WTO package that would be pulled together and accelerated negotiations post Bali.

#### WTO solves global war—non-discrimination is key

Moore, 5

(Mike, New politician and former Director-General of the World Trade Organization, “Ten Years of the WTO: A Success Story of Global Governance”, http://www.fes.de/IPG/IPG2\_2005/MIKEMOORE.PDF, 2/2005)

Non-discrimination has been key to the multilateral trading system’s success. Preferential trade blocs and alliances, by definition, exclude and marginalize non-member countries. This not only hurts the countries themselves, but can be harmful for the system as a whole. It is widely accepted that competition and conflict amongst trade blocs in the interwar years was a major cause of global instability – paving the way for a descending spiral of tit-for-tat protectionism, economic depression, and ultimately world war**.** The multilateral trading system – based on a uniform set of international rules under which all countries are treated equally – was designed precisely to avoid a world of inward-looking trade blocs and self-destructive factionalism. From a national perspective, the principle of non-discrimination has also allowed countries to liberalize their economies and integrate into the world trading system at their own pace. mfn and National Treatment do not demand »harmonization « towards universal norms or rules. On the contrary, these rules were designed precisely to allow countries to maintain their own policy »space,« to set their own standards and priorities, as long as all economic actors – foreign and domestic – are treated equally**.** Non-discrimination has provided the essential underpinning for the huge expansion of global trade over the past half century, and for the broad political consensus to move the system forward into new sectors and wider responsibilities. Non-discrimination has also enshrined universality as a central objective of the trading system. It is certainly one major reason why the gatt/wto system has emerged, especially after the Cold War, as a major force for integrating developing and transition countries into the world economy.

### 3

Text: The United States federal government should sign, ratify, and implement the Kyoto protocol, should put into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, should join the International Criminal Court, and should ratify the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Solves multilat – your 1ac Burgsdorff ev proves – that cx

### 4

#### Ending the embargo pumps cash into the communist agenda - kills US credibility and causes Latin American democratic backsliding

**Brookes 9** Peter Brookes4/16/2009 (heritage council, Senior Fellow, Brookes is serving his third term as a congressionally appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He previously served in the administration of President George W. Bush as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs. In this post, he was responsible for U.S. defense policy for 38 countries and five bilateral defense alliances in Asia, Brookes was a professional staff member with the House International Relations Committee. He also served with the CIA and the State Department at the United Nations. In the private sector, he worked in the defense and intelligence industries.

A decorated Navy veteran, Brookes served on active duty in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East in aviation and intelligence billets, Brookes, now a retired Navy commander, served as a reservist with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Vice President, Brookes is pursuing a doctorate at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.); the Defense Language Institute (Russian); the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He also has taught at the National Defense University and studied German and Polish, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Obama weakness causes global conflict

Coes 11 – Ben Coes 11, Visiting Fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. A graduate of Columbia College, where he won the prestigious Bennett Cerf Memorial Prize “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

### 5

#### China’s Latin American influence is increasing – trends prove

Martinez 13 (Guillermo I. Martinez, Columnist Sun Sentinel, “America losing influence throughout Latin America,” http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-23/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523\_1\_drug-cartels-latin-america-pri)

Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China. The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America foreign policy. The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power.

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. May 2012- The Inter-American Dialogue - “The United States, ¶ Latin America and China: ¶ A “Triangular Relationship”?” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661\_China\_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf

At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### Multilat

#### Multilat can’t be pragmatically implemented

Holmes 10 — VP, foreign policy and defense studies, Heritage. Frmr Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Member of the CFR. Frmr adjunct prof of history, Georgetown. PhD in history, Georgetown (Kim, Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations, 21 Sept. 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations, AMiles)

The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the U.N. The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently leading to institutional paralysis when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: “The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”[1] Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region, country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[2] when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[3] If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. It requires the political will and diplomatic skill of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in Foreign Affairs.[4] Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations, from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[5] for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[6] The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[7] all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions. This one-country, one-vote principle makes the U.N. an extremely difficult venue in which to wage successful multilateral diplomacy. In this environment, multilateralism becomes a double-edged sword. It can sometimes speed up global responses to global problems, as with the avian flu outbreak and the Asian tsunami. At other times, it can slow or prevent timely responses, as with halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program and stopping genocide in Darfur. Too often, multilateralism at the U.N. is the political means by which other countries and regional blocs constrain or block action. Groups of small nations can join together to outvote the great powers on key issues, and this situation can often lead to bizarre outcomes and compromises. Even seemingly noncontroversial issues, such as improving auditing of U.N. expenditures, require days of skillful, almost nonstop negotiations. The U.N. is simply too poorly primed for American multilateralism. It is a vast labyrinth of agencies, offices, committees, commissions, programs, and funds, often with overlapping and duplicative missions.[8] Lines of accountability and responsibility for specific issues or efforts are complex, confused, and often indecipherable. For example, dozens of U.N. bodies focus on development, the environment, and children’s and women’s issues. Coordination is minimal. Reliable means to assess the effectiveness of the bodies’ independent activities is practically nonexistent. Although institutional fiefdoms and bureaucratic interests strongly influence the formulation of U.N. policy, programs, and resolutions, the most powerful actors remain the member states. Each tries to persuade the U.N. as an institution to advocate and adopt its positions on the matters most important to it. The chaos of conflicting priorities rarely results in consensus for decisive action. The most common result is inaction or a lowest-common-denominator outcome. Too often, the United States also finds that other countries’ positions on an issue have been predetermined in their regional or political groupings. These groupings include the European Union; the G-77, or Group of 77 (which is really a caucus of some 130 countries, including China, Iran, and Cuba); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the African Union (AU); the Arab League; and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Some countries participate in several of these blocs. Added to this mix is heavy lobbying by “civil society” special interest groups, especially on contentious causes, which helps to explain why the United States faces an uphill battle in successfully husbanding any policy proposal through the U.N. system. Perhaps the most stunning example came under President Bill Clinton, when the United States was trying to negotiate changes to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), so that the United States could sign it. Intense lobbying by nongovernmental organizations at the proceedings culminated in dramatic cheering when 120 countries voted in favor of the statute despite U.S. objections.[9] Of course, the most difficult forum for negotiating multilateral solutions is the Security Council, where the most serious security matters are raised and the greatest failures of multilateralism have occurred. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union largely shut down the council with its veto. As a result, the United States conducted most of its international affairs outside of the U.N., yet very few complaints of unilateralism were heard. That changed when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the hope was that the U.N. would at last become a force for good in the world. Instead, new rivalries have emerged that undermine its effectiveness. Perhaps the most frustrating development for U.S. multilateralism at the U.N. in the post–Cold War era has been the inability of the United States to develop a shared position with some of its best friends in Europe. Often, the allies say that they cannot negotiate with the United States until the European Union has taken a “common European position.” Yet after that common position has been adopted, individual European countries claim far less flexibility to negotiate. The EU also has been known to strong-arm its allies as well as its member states to oppose U.S. positions. For example, on the issue of genocide in Darfur, I witnessed the EU’s most visible leaders pressing the United States to accept the ICC as the international judicial authority to try war crimes committed in Sudan, rather than setting up an ad hoc tribunal. Furthermore, they leaned on Romania to go along with their position, even threatening Romania with punitive action if it did not. Countries hostile to the United States and to economic and political freedoms can and do take full advantage of this crack in the West’s once-unified front. Sometimes, though, the United States is its own worst enemy. Intense interagency discussions must take place before the State Department sends out any instruction cable to its negotiators at the U.N. and diplomats in capitals. Such delays can be costly because they give other countries time to sway votes against the U.S. position, leaving U.S. negotiators with little time to convince others to change their minds. For U.S. negotiators, this process can blur not only the clarity of purpose, but also policy objectives. Even after the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council hammer out a policy, U.S. diplomats are sometimes simply unable to advance it. Many who are fairly new to the negotiations must deal with counterparts from other countries who have worked the same issue in international settings for years. Some U.S. diplomats would rather settle for consensus than work for an outcome in which the U.S. will be isolated and which places America alongside pariah states such as Zimbabwe or Sudan, even if those countries voted with the United States for starkly different reasons.

#### Shows of good faith won’t create trust

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 142

Finally, just because the United States is a democracy doesn't mean that others won't fear its hegemonic power. When important geopolitical interests are on the line, realpolitik, not regime type, determines great power policies. The fact that U.S. power is unbalanced—and that Washington is so little constrained—means that, whenever it believes its interests dictate, the United States can throw the purported constrictures of democratic benevolence out the window and act as hegemon typically have acted. Indeed, since the end of the cold war, the nature, and scope, of America's hegemonic ambitions have become increasingly apparent even to its liberal democratic allies. The post cold war policies of the United States have caused other states to have second thoughts about whether it really is a status quo power. And the fact that the United States is a democratic hegemon does nothing to cause nondemocratic states (either second-tier major powers or lesser-ranking regional powers) to regard the United States as a benevolent hegemon.

#### Regionalism’s coming now – solves the impact to multilat

Krishnan Srinivasan, "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century," THE ROUND TABLE v. 98 n. 400, 2009, pp. 37-47.

The new world order of the ﬁrst half of the present century will be one of peaceful mutual accommodation between the big powers located in the East and West, North and South. The priority for these powers will be for economic progress and regional order, with defence expenditure being used to build technological capacity for deterrence against the other big powers and as an enabler for their self-appointed but globally recognized role as regional enforcers. In this neo-Hobbesian world system, the lesser states will come to their own bilateral arrangements with the local regional hegemon upon whom they will be dependent not only for their security but for economic, technical and trading facilitation. Some of these lesser entities will enjoy economic prosperity, depending on their ability to maintain internal cohesion, to turn globalization to their advantage, and to control the socio-economic consequences of climate change, but they will not be able to mount a challenge to the hierarchical nature of international society. They will have far greater recourse to the United Nations than the major powers, who will prefer to apply unilateral methods with the connivance and consent of their peers. The debate between Westphalian national sovereignty and the right to intervene to breach the sovereignty of other states on the grounds of preventing threats to international peace and security will not be resolved. Political and economic inequality between nations will be drawn in ever sharper focus. Regional institutions will be dominated by the local big power. Reform of the United Nations will be incomplete and unappealing to the vast majority of member states. The world’s hegemonic powers will lose faith in the Security Council as an effective mechanism to deliberate issues of peace and security. World bodies will be used for discussion of global issues such as the environment and climate change, pandemic disease, energy and food supplies, and development, but resulting action will primarily devolve on the big powers in the affected regions. This will particularly be the case in the realm of peace and security in which only the regional hegemon will have the means, the will and the obligation, for the sake of its own status and security, to ensure resolution or retribution as each case may demand. Even in a globalized world, regional and local action will be the prime necessity and such action will be left to the power best equipped to understand the particular circumstances, select the appropriate remedy and execute the action required to administer it. Conﬂict will be contained and localized. There will be no menace of war on a world-wide scale and little fear of international terrorism. Private-enterprise terrorist actions will continue to manifest political, social and economic frustrations, but they will be parochial, ineffective and not state-sponsored. There will be far less invocation of human rights in international politics, since these will be identiﬁed with a western agenda and western civilization: there will be an equal recognition of community rights and societal values associated with Eastern and other traditions. Chinese artists, Indian entrepreneurs, Russian actors, Iranian chefs, South African song-writers and Brazilian designers will be household names; models on the fashion cat-walk and sporting teams from all major countries will be distinctly multi-racial, reﬂecting the immigration to, but also the purchasing power of, the new major powers. National populations will show evidence of mixed race more than ever before in history. Climate change will be an acknowledged global challenge and all countries, led by the regional hegemons, will undertake binding restraints on carbon emissions. The world will become acutely conscious of the essentiality of access to fresh water. The pace of technological innovation will accelerate at dizzying speed, further accentuating inequalities. There will be very rapid steps taken to develop alternative sources of energy in the face of dwindling and costly oil supplies. Western industrialized nations, to remain competitive, will vacate vast areas of traditional manufacturing in favour of new technologies and green engineering. The world will be a safer and stable place until one of the hegemons eventually develops an obvious ascendancy ﬁrst regionally, then continentally and ﬁnally globally over all the others.

#### And legitimacy failure preserves the trend towards regionalism – shows of American good faith only result in soft-balancing

Michael J. Mazarr, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College, "The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 35 n. 4, Fall 2012, p. 14-15.

Diplomacy increasingly fails. A parallel risk has to do with the ebbing force of U.S. diplomacy and influence. International power is grounded in legitimacy, and in many ways it is precisely the legitimacy of the leading power’s global posture that is under assault as its posture comes into question. Historically, rising challengers gradually stop respecting the hegemon’s right to lead, and they begin to make choices on behalf of the international community, in part due to strategies consciously designed to frustrate the leading power’s designs. Germany, under Bismarck and after, is one example: It aspired to unification and to its ‘‘rightful place’’ as a leading European power as its power and influence accumulated, its willingness to accept the inherent legitimacy of the existing order as defined by other states, and the validity and force of their security paradigms, declined proportionately. At nearly all points in this trajectory, German leaders did not seek to depose the international system, but to crowd into its leadership ranks, to mute the voices of others relative to its own influence, and to modify rather than abolish rules.¶ We begin to see this pattern today with regard to many emerging powers, but especially of course, China’s posture toward the United States.31 As was predicted and expected in the post-Cold War context of growing regional power centers, the legitimacy of a system dominated by the United States is coming under increasing challenge. More states (and, increasingly, non-state actors) want to share in setting rules and norms and dictating outcomes.¶ The obvious and inevitable result has been to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. While measuring the relative success of a major power’s diplomacy over time is a chancy business (and while Washington continues to have success on many fronts), the current trajectory is producing a global system much less subject to the power of U.S. diplomacy and other forms of influence. Harvard’s Stephen Walt catalogues the enormous strengths of the U.S. position during and after the Cold War, and compares that to recent evidence of the emerging limits of U.S. power. Such evidence includes Turkey’s unwillingness to support U.S. deployments in Iraq, the failure to impose U.S. will or order in Iraq or Afghanistan, failures of nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, the Arab Spring’s challenges to long-standing U.S. client rulers, and more.32 As emerging powers become more focused on their own interests and goals, their domestic dynamics will become ever more self-directed and less subject to manipulation from Washington, a trend evident in a number of major recent elections.¶ Washington will still enjoy substantial influence, and many states will welcome (openly or grudgingly) a U.S. leadership role. But without revising the U.S. posture, the gap between U.S. ambitions and capabilities will only grow. Continually trying to do too much will create more risk of demands unmet, requests unfulfilled, and a growing sense of the absurdity of the U.S. posture. Such a course risks crisis and conflict. Similarly, doubt in the threats and promises underpinning an unviable U.S. security posture risks conflict: U.S. officials will press into situations assuming that their diplomacy will be capable of achieving certain outcomes and will make demands and lay out ultimatums on that basis only to find that their influence cannot achieve the desired goals, and they must escalate to harsher measures. The alternative is to shift to a lesser role with more limited ambitions and more sustainable legitimacy.

#### The plan won’t lead to effective multilateralism

Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister and former senior vice president of the World Bank, is a member of the Spanish Council of State, “The U.S. suffers from strategic blindness”, 11-7-13, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2013/Nov-07/237017-the-us-suffers-from-strategic-blindness.ashx#ixzz2kNblgrQo>, CMR

That is all the more true given that the nature of such problems has also changed. America, like the rest of us, is vulnerable to climate change, pandemics and terrorism – challenges that require coordinated global solutions. For the U.S., however, the utility of multilateralism is purely situational. Above all, multilateralism is never preferable to a “good” bilateral solution – a view that has reinforced behavior that undermines, rather than strengthens, the capacity for effective international action. Indeed, always ready to negotiate treaties but rarely prepared to sign – and even less likely to ratify – them, the U.S. remains absent from such key global agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its inspired creativity and support in building formal institutions like the United Nations and World Bank has given way to a predilection for weak, informal and ad hoc groupings, such as the various G-somethings and “coalitions of the willing.” Establishing effective multilateralism requires an emphasis on rules and institutions that facilitate coordination. The recent decision by the U.S. to sign the Arms Trade Treaty could be a good start – if only Congress could marshal the bipartisan support needed to ratify it. But scattered moves in the right direction will not suffice. What is really needed is a change in vision and mentality – a shift from viewing multilateralism as a tactic to embracing it as a strategic imperative.

#### Domestic politics tank implementation

Held 13, David Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” <http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation>, CMR

The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.¶ Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems---indeed it is---but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.

### Instability

Hotspots don’t escalate

Drenzer 10- prof of pol sci at Fletcher (Daniel, 12/31, Foreign Policy, “Some desperately needed New Year’s resolutions for 2011” http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/31/some\_new\_years\_resolutions\_for\_the\_foreign\_policy\_community\_in\_2011, da 1/5, mat)

[Fill in the blank] is an "existential threat". This term of art has been on the rise for decades, but it seemed omnipresent this past year. To be sure, lots of actors face a lot of threats out there in world politics. The bar has to be pretty high, however, for something to be an "existential threat." For my money, it means that the country or its modus operandi could be completely extinguished. Using this criteria, there are no existential threats to the United States in the international system. In 2010, this term was increasingly used by Israelis with respect to Iran. So, let's stipulate that if Iran were ever to acquire/develop, say, a dozen nuclear weapons, then the country would represent an existential threat to Israel. Commentators who do this, however, would also need to stipulate that Israel, in possessing 60-85 warheads, has represented an existential threat to Iran for decades.

**No impact – instability will cause reforms, not military conflict**

**Perez-Linan 08 –** prof @ Pitt[Aníbal Pérez-Liñán is associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, “Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America,” http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521178495&ss=fro]

The 1990s were an era of great hopes for Latin America. After the demise of authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and the early 1990s, major economic reforms were undertaken in most Latin American countries in order to reduce chronic inflation and promote sustained growth. For many contemporary observers, the **confluence of democracy and free markets** signaled a break with the past, the dawn of a new era of civil liberties, prosperity, and **political stability**. More than a decade later, it is hard to look back at this period without a mixture of nostalgia and sarcasm. The legacies of the 1990s varied from country to country, but they can be generally described as notable achievements overshadowed by missed opportunities. In the economic realm, hyperinflation was eventually defeated, but economic growth remained elusive and poverty resilient. In the political arena, the military eventually withdrew from politics (not a minor feat), but elected governments, surprisingly, continued to collapse. Starting in the early 1990s, presidents were removed from office in Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia – in some countries recurrently. This outcome frequently represented the triumph of an indignant society over a corrupt or abusive executive, but it seldom prevented the occurrence of new abuses in later administrations. By the early years of the twenty-first century, it was clear that the particular circumstances of each crisis represented only parts of a broader puzzle – a new pattern of political instability emerging in the region. This book explores the origins and the consequences of this novel pattern of instability, emphasizing the critical events that defined the new trend between 1992 and 2004. During this period, civilian elites realized that traditional military coups had become for the most part unfeasible and experimented with the use of constitutional instruments to remove unpopular presidents from office. Presidential impeachment thus became a distinctive mark of the new political landscape in Latin America. The recurrence of presidential crises without democratic breakdown challenged many dominant views among political scientists. Latin American democracies proved to be simultaneously enduring and unstable, willing to punish presidential corruption but unable to prevent it, and responsive to popular demands only in the context of massive protests and widespread frustration. My attempts to understand these facts initially relied on well-delimited theoretical perspectives that proved rather disappointing, and I was forced to embark on a long exploration across the disciplinary boundaries of political sociology, communication, political behavior, institutional analysis, democratization, and the study of social movements. Others who have studied these topics more thoroughly than I may be reluctant to recognize their subject in the chapters that follow, but I hope that they will forgive my intrusion. In the course of this exploration I have wandered through the academic fields of many colleagues and collected a large number of intellectual debts along the way.

Reforms are coming now in Cuba—solve stability and means the embargo will inevitably be lifted -----GREEN

Sweig and Rockefeller, 2013 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, and Michael Bustamante “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>)

#### Small-time diaspora capital may prove easier to regulate and rely on than funds from multinational corporations driven strictly by profits. Under the repatriation provisions of the island's new migration law, some Cubans may even retire to the island with their pensions and savings after decades of working abroad. Yet opening the doors for more young citizens to leave could prove risky for a quickly aging, low-birthrate society that has been suffering from a brain drain for some time. Besides, along with remittance dollars, Cuba urgently needs both medium and large investors. Ultimately, only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base. Castro appears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector are the only ways to tackle this long-term predicament. The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution, however. Officials are wary of rocking the domestic political boat, and citizens and party leaders alike recoil from the prospect of more radical shock therapy. Rising public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption have only reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism. Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task. In late 2012, Havana legalized the creation of transportation cooperatives -- private, profit-sharing entities owned and manage by their members -- to fix bottlenecks in agricultural distribution. Meanwhile, 100 state enterprises are now running their finances completely autonomously as part of a yearlong pilot program. The government is also reportedly considering ways to offer a wider array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms for joint ventures. But the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions -- recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing the budget while incongruously insisting, in the words of its official 2011 guidelines, that "central planning, and not the market, will take precedence."¶ EASING OFF THE DADDY STATE¶ Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuity requires threading a delicate ideological needle. Although the government expects to continue providing Cubans with key social services, such as health care and education, party leaders have reprimanded the island's citizens for otherwise depending too heavily on what one prominent official a few years ago called the "daddy state." In the eyes of many Cubans, this is deeply ironic. Cuba's revolutionary founders, who built up a paternalistic state in the service of equality, are now calling for that state's partial dismantlement. What's more, most Cubans already need to resort to the black market or assistance from family abroad to acquire many daily necessities.

The plan creates a political whirlwind that kills reforms and causes instability-----GREEN

Hernandez, 2012 (Cuba’s Leading Social Sciences professor and researcher at the University of Havana and the High Institute of International Relations; Director of U.S. studies at the Centro de Estudios sobre America; and a Senior Research Fellow at the Instituto cubano de Investigacion Cultural “Juan Marinello” in Havana. “Debating U.S-Cuban Relations”)

#### As far as costs are concerned, although many Cubans favor detente and appreciate its economic benefits, they also remain worried about its political and ideological effects. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value. A wave of U.S. capital flooding a Cuban economy that has not completed its reform process could have some counter­productive effects. The U.S. government could try to steer the flow of capital to favor its political goals. Various groups— Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses—would have more avenues to influence the Cuban domestic context.¶ Given the fundamental asymmetry of power between the two sides, once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the United States were to reverse its policy and begin to "make concessions" in return for "equivalent Cuban responses," the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation. This won't be one more round but, rather, a whole new rule book. In other words, with any increased chance of an alternative form of relations, the risk profile of quid pro quo increases. For Cuba, to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a conservative line and play defensively only; or it could mean to invent a new proactive strategy for the game. Within such a new approach, the ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive. Classically, the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in alliances and in consensus. This issue is complex both for Cuba and for the United States. Besides allied powers, affinities within the international system, and sympathetic ideological currents, the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "rivals" or "opponents" but also that of" allies" within the "enemy's" own camp. The identities of such allies of the United States in the region, in Europe, and also on the Island are obvious. The allies of Cuba are also well known, paradoxically including novel ones such as many business executives and military officials who had classically been the "tips of the imperialist spear."¶ In a scenario of re-encounter between the United States and Cuba, both governments face the challenge of overcoming old dogmas, dealing with changes in the respective political consensus of each, trying to reshape those and restructure their alliances. The main weakness Cuba must overcome is not its lesser military or physical power but its siege mentality. That of the United States is not its ineptitude in dealing effectively with "communist regimes" but its sense of superpower omnipotence.

#### military overstretch not a problem—cheap by historic standards, no incentive to balance

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 49.

To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after fighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”

**Terrorists can’t use bioweapons**

**Leitenberg, IR prof, 5—**Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles) Ellipses in original

Five essential requirements must be mastered in order to produce biological agents: • One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen. • One must know how to handle the organism correctly. • One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics. • One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up production properly. • One must know how to disperse the product properly. 139 A U.S. military field manual dating back to the 1960s remarks on the attributes of a desirable BW agent, that in addition to its pathogenicity, “means must be available for maintaining the agent’s virulence or infectivity during production, storage, and transportation.” 140 One should add, most particularly during its dispersal as well. Two members of Sweden’s biodefense program stress methods on how to optimize formulations of BW agents as the most critical step of all: “They key competence is . . . how to formulate the organisms to facilitate aerosolization of particles that cause severe disease by inhalation.” 141 It is interesting that the classified 1999 DIA report quoted earlier in the section on state programs contained a single sentence regarding the possible use of BW agents by terrorist groups: “Terrorist use should also be anticipated primarily in improvised devices, probably in association with an explosive.” 142 No anticipation of the capability for aerosol distribution was mentioned, no overflight of cities, sports stadiums, etc. In a recent BW “Risk Assessment” published elsewhere, a group of authors from the Sandia National Laboratory listed a series of factors closely paralleling the above as “Technical Hurdles to Successful BW Deployment”: acquisition of a virulent agent; production of the agent in suitable form and quantity; and, effective deployment of the agent. This was summed up in simple words as “obtaining a pathogen or toxin . . ., isolation, amplification, protection against environmental degradation, and development of an effective dissemination method.” They concluded that “Even a low-consequence event requires a 47 considerable level of expertise to execute.” 143 Dr. Steven Block, Chair of the U.S. DoD Defense Science Board Summer Study on biological weapons in the late 1990s explained the same requirements. A lesson from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that any group bent on developing offensive bio-weapons capabilities must overcome two significant problems, one biological and the other physical. First, it must acquire and produce stable quantities of a suitably potent agent. For a variety of reasons, this is not the trivial task that it is sometimes made out to be. Second, it must have an effective means of delivering the agent to the intended target. For most, but not all, bio-weapon agents, this translates into solving problems of dispersal. Programs in both the United States and the USSR devoted years of effort to perfecting these aspects. 144 Unfortunately, a recent example provides the sort of grossly uninformed description that is more frequently provided to the general public. Speaking at the Harvard Medical School on June 1, 2005, and trading on his training as a medical doctor as he frequently does, Senator Frist claimed that “. . . a few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently innocuous setting [could] mount a first- order biological attack. It is even possible to synthesize virulent pathogens from scratch, or to engineer and manufacture prions . . .” He repeated that this was “the single greatest threat to our safety and security today.” 145 The remarks are a travesty: “. . . a few technicians . . . middling skill . . . few thousand dollars,” leading to a “first-order ading to a “ ading to a “ ” a biological attack, and additionally extending this to “synthesizing virulent pathogens” in the same breath. To bolster his argument, Senator Frist larded his presentation with other gross inaccuracies, claiming that “During the Cold War, the Soviet Union . . . stockpiled 5,000 tons annually of biowarfare- engineered anthrax resistant to 16 antibiotics.” The only source in the world for the tonnage of anthrax stockpiled by the USSR is Dr. Ken Alibek. 146 He has never quoted a figure higher than 200 tons, and he has never claimed that the 200 tons was produced “annually,” or in any single year. The USSR’s anthrax stockpile consisted of a genetically unmodified classical strain (or strains). 147 The antibiotic resistant strain which was developed by Soviet BW laboratories in the mid- to late-1980s was not resistant to 16 antibiotics, but to half that number, and had not yet reached the point of being stockpiled Page 56 48 by the time that the Soviet BW program began to be cut back in 1989. Finally, the 5,000-ton figure is the approximate sum of the annual production capacities of all Soviet-era BW mobilization production facilities that would have initiated production only with the onset of, or just prior to a (nuclear) war with the United States. No such quantities of BW agents were ever produced in the USSR

**No extinction**

**O’Neill 4** O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

**Status quo preparedness solves**

**Science Centric 9** (Study finds program has improved health agencies' preparedness for bioterror and disease outbreaks, 25 March 2009, http://www.sciencecentric.com/news/article.php?q=09032505-study-finds-program-has-improved-health-agencies-preparedness-bioterror-disease-outbreaks, Amiles)

A federal program designed to help metropolitan public health agencies prepare to deliver essential medicines to the public after a large-scale bioterror attack or natural disease outbreak has succeeded in improving the level of readiness, according to a new RAND Corporation study. Researchers found that the federal Cities Readiness Initiative, a program active in 72 metropolitan areas, appears to have improved agencies' ability to rapidly and widely dispense life-saving medications and other medical supplies in the event of a large-scale bioterror attack or a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak. The study from RAND Health concludes there is merit in extending the program so the impact can be further monitored, although the analysis did not assess the cost-effectiveness of the effort or compare it to other public health priorities. 'The Cities Readiness Initiative has helped agencies in the nation's most-populous regions become better able to dispense life-saving medication following a bioterrorism event or after an infectious disease outbreak,' said Henry Willis, the study's lead author and a policy researcher at RAND, a non-profit research organisation. Researchers concluded that a key reason the Cities Readiness Initiative has helped promote improvements has been its focus on a single scenario with a well-defined numeric goal and the technical assistance it has provided to public health officials. Researchers say the initiative has helped increase the number of local public health staff members working on medication dispensing planning, strengthened partnerships between public health officials and local first-responder agencies, and helped pay for new equipment such as mobile drug dispensing units. Other public health improvements fostered by the Cities Readiness Initiative are the development of more-detailed plans for medication dispensing, including creation of new strategies that rely less on medically trained staff and take greater advantage of nontraditional venues such as hotels, resorts, churches as well as drive-through dispensing in parking lots and fairgrounds. The Cities Readiness Initiative was created in 2004 to improve the ability of the nation's largest metropolitan regions to provide life-saving medications in the event of a large-scale bioterror attack or naturally occurring disease outbreak. The program has spent about $300 million on efforts thus far. Administered by the federal Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the program helps jurisdictions improve their ability to provide antibiotics and other life-saving medications to 100 percent of a region's population within 48 hours of a large-scale anthrax attack or large-scale infectious disease emergency. The 72 regions that have received funding account for about 57 percent of the nation's population. RAND researchers conducted their study by reviewing plans and technical surveys completed by agencies that assessed capabilities in 12 functional areas (e.g., distribution of medication, dispensing of antibiotics), as well as conducting in-depth interviews with officials from nine regions.

**The threat of bioterror is hype**

**Reynolds, Former economic director at Hudson 5—**Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Formerly Director of Economic Research at the Hudson Institute. AB in economics from UCLA. (Alan, WMD Doomsday Distractions, 10 April 2005, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=4235, AMiles)

The report lacked not merely facts but common sense. The commission found the CIA's worst errors were due "chiefly to flaws in analysis," and to the "fundamental assumptions and premises of its analytic judgments," and "an inferential leap." The panel blamed insufficient imagination. The greater danger may be too much imagination -- dreaming up long-shot science-fiction scenarios, like those recently leaked from the Homeland Security Department involving demonstrably ineffective agents delivered by inexplicable devices. In the partially prescient 1996 Kurt Russell film "Executive Decision," Islamic terrorists hijack an airliner to kill "millions of Americans" with bombs filled with sarin nerve gas. Jet fuel would have been a less thrilling yet more realistic threat. As the Economist noted two weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: "Although a few molecules of sarin are enough to kill a person, it takes hundreds of pounds of chemicals to achieve that concentration in an open air attack." On Oct. 2, 2001, the Washington Post's reporters Joby Warrick and Joe Stephens found defense and intelligence agencies had become so enthralled with sarin, smallpox and other hypothetical "weapons of mass destruction" they didn't connect three dots: commercial planes were often hijacked; jet fuel is explosive; suicidal terrorist tactics are common. The article revealed "elaborate multiagency planning exercises with flashy names such as 'Red Ex' and 'Dark Winter' focused overwhelmingly on biological and chemical threats, while experts urging preparations for a simpler, more conventional attack found it difficult to be heard. ... Lots of money poured into research on chemical and biological threats. Entire research institutes were created for it." The postwar death toll from bioterrorism is only six -- five Americans from anthrax and one Bulgarian assassinated with ricin. The death toll from chemical terrorism is 26 -- 19 from sarin gas in Japanese subways a decade ago and seven in Chicago in 1982 killed by Tylenol laced with cyanide. In March 1999, The Post's science writer Daniel Greenberg already sensed a "whiff of hysteria-fanning and budget opportunism in the scary scenarios of the saviors who have stepped forward against the menace of bioterrorism." Today, the federal cost of this bioterrorism bonanza is $7.9 billion a year -- nearly $2 billion for each known victim of bioterrorism. Yet taxpayers are still assaulted by periodic hysteria-fanning studies from opportunistic institutes claiming, "The United States remains woefully unprepared to protect the public against terrorists wielding biological agents." Lumping nuclear weapons with a hodgepodge of biological and chemical agents as weapons of "mass" destruction is intended to imply germs and chemicals are as dangerous as nuclear bombs. In a January 2003 speech, former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz claimed Iraq had enough ricin to kill "more than 1 million people," botulinum toxin (botox) "to kill tens of millions" and anthrax "to kill hundreds of millions." To use ricin to kill many people, someone would have to dump hundreds of tons of it on a small area. To kill many with anthrax or botox, someone would have to first get the victims to sniff weapons-grade anthrax or eat botulism-contaminated food and then shun antibiotics or antitoxins. Four months before the September 11 attacks, the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a "Dark Winter" war game that assumed the smallpox virus could somehow be released in three shopping malls without anyone noticing, leaving 3,000 unknowingly infected. Each victim was (wrongly) assumed to infect 10 more, through casual contact with travelers who didn't notice their pox. Compounding supposedly resulted in a million deaths within two months. Dark Winter was cited as a reason the Bush administration spent a half-billion dollars on 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine and tried to force risky vaccinations on first responders. Wall Street Journal science columnist Sharon Belgey debunked "Dark Winter" in November 2002, quoting Swiss expert Peter Merkle about "the sensationalistic press and marketing hype emerging from the burgeoning biodefense industry." "Dark Winter" assumed everyone infected spread the infection to 10 others, but teams of researchers say the scenario is tenfold too large. "Smallpox spreads slowly and is not very contagious," Miss Begley noted. Smallpox symptoms are quite visible, which acts like a big quarantine sign. Even a partial quarantine and local vaccinations have proven effective against smallpox. After the Iraq invasion turned up no WMD, a Wall Street Journal editorial seized on inspector David Kay's mention of Iraqi research on aflatoxin -- a carcinogenic mold that is researched because excessive aflatoxin on nuts can result in export bans. A U.S. lab worker once tried to commit suicide by ingesting a lot of aflatoxin, but failed. To use aflatoxin, anthrax, botox or ricin to kill more than a half-dozen people, you have to imagine some device for effectively delivering such agents. When it came to imaginary delivery systems, WMD fear-mongering escalated to the absurd. The 2002 British dossier claimed, "Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles." But biological agents (except ricin) are living organisms, which would be killed by any bomb, shell or missile. Chemical agents are liquid at room temperature, not gaseous, and most effective in closed spaces like a subway car or building. Chemical agents can be delivered by artillery shells, but how could terrorists sneak into a city with a 4-ton Howitzer? If terrorists can attack us with artillery shells, free-fall bombs or missiles, we should worry far more about conventional explosives than sarin shellings or aflatoxin bombs. Former Secretary of State Powell told the United Nations that Iraq had "ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air." But few biological agents (except anthrax) can survive sunlight, and none can survive chlorine. And it would take many huge trucks to poison a small water reservoir. What about fears of biological agents dispersed indiscriminately into the air? Scenario spinners speculate about mixing anthrax with water and somehow spraying it (without detection) from trucks, crop dusters or unmanned aircraft. But to die from anthrax, you need to inhale thousands of spores. Those spores clump together and mix with dust, yet they must end up neither too large nor too small, or else they would be sneezed out, coughed up or swallowed. Even if enough particles of the perfect size could be sprayed into the breezes, the odds are extremely low of infecting more than few dozen people that way. And none would die if they took Cipro promptly. The biggest danger of past and present alarmist statements about biological terrorism is that endless exaggeration of low-probability events continues diverting limited attention and resources away from real weapons real terrorists really use -- airplanes, machine guns, arson, suicide bombs and car bombs.

**Extremely low risk of an explosion from terrorist**

**Kaplan, ‘7**

[Eben, “Liquefied natural gas: a potential terrorist target?” Council on foreign relations, April 11, 2007, **http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/**]

Yes, because of LNG's explosive potential, experts say. Al-Qaeda, for example, has specifically cited LNG as a desirable target, says Rob Knake, senior associate at Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, a homeland-security private consulting firm. Pipelines are not as attractive because the flow of gas can quickly be cut off and an explosion easily contained. Terminals make better targets because an attack could result in a massive fire that could potentially kill scores of people. They are also good targets because "if you take out those terminals, you could have a significant disruption [in the U.S. gas supply,]" Knake says. But an attack on an LNG terminal might not be so damaging. Terminals are equipped with emergency fire detection mechanisms designed to minimize the impact of fires resulting from terrorist attacks or accidents. The most attractive targets are the boats: 1,000-foot tankers with double hulls and specially constructed storage tanks that keep the LNG cold. A report, put out by Good Harbor Consulting assessing the risk of a proposed LNG terminal in Providence, Rhode Island, concluded that a successful terrorist attack on a tanker could result in as many as 8,000 deaths and upwards of 20,000 injuries**. It is important to keep in mind that this is the worst case scenario.** **A report on LNG safety and security by the University of Texas' Center for Energy and Economics explains LNG "tanks require exceptionally large amounts of force to cause damage. Because the amount of energy required to breach containment is so large, in almost all cases the major hazard presented by terrorists is a fire, not an explosion."**

**High levels of security ensure that even in the case of explosion there will be limited causalities.**

**Kaplan, ‘7**

[Eben, “Liquefied natural gas: a potential terrorist target?” Council on foreign relations, April 11, 2007, **http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/**]

**LNG tankers approaching U.S. waters must provide ninety-six hours' notice, allowing the Coast Guard to provide a small flotilla to safely escort the boat to its destination**. Added **security detail includes local police boats, divers, firefighting tugboats, and a helicopter. Bridges** along the tanker's route **are closed and nearby airports suspend flights**. Any private vessels that drift too close are sternly turned away. **Tankers are inspected and screened for explosives before they are allowed to approach land, and tanker crews must pass a security check before being allowed to board the vessels.** **At LNG terminals, there is also a heavy security presence; access to the terminals is controlled, and security personnel perform regular threat-response drills.**

**No risk of LNG terrorist explosion and security measures check**

**Eagle Speak ‘5**

[the author is an Attorney, Retired Navy Reserve Captain, “How Big Is the Threat of LNG Tankers and Terrorists?”, March 6, http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:ewgIRrfJ1UMJ:www.eaglespeak.us/2005/03/how-big-is-threat-of-lng-tankers-and.html+lng+tanker+explosion&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us]

**A terrorist attack on an LNG facility or LNG carrier would most likely involve an attempt to spill a large quantity of LNG in the hope of generating a flammable vapor cloud**. As discussed earlier**, this probably requires causing a massive failure of a storage tank, either on the ship or on shore. The force required to breach the tank would almost certainly result in a fire at the tank location thereby limiting the damage potential as a result of the action. Given that other targets that could cause more widespread damage with more certainty of outcome are available, terrorism targeting an LNG facility is thought to be unlikely**. **Notwithstanding that, law enforcement agencies and LNG operators have developed procedures to thwart any such attempts.** What? No explosion with thermonuclear- like force? Why not? Part of the answer lies in the nature of LNG as explained here: Like other products that are considered flammable liquids, **LNG must first be vaporized, then mixed with air, and then exposed to an ignition source before it will ignite. Natural gas in its liquid form, LNG, cannot ignite. Only the natural gas vapor, which forms when LNG’s temperature rises, can be ignited but its flammability depends primarily on its air content**. The flammable range lies between 5% and 15% in air, by volume. **For ignition to occur when LNG vapor contacts a hot surface, the temperature of that surface must exceed 1004ºF...When LNG is confined within a tank, ignition of the natural gas vapors cannot occur due to the lack of oxygen. If LNG leaks out and begins evaporating in an open area, the natural gas vapors are often quickly dispersed by wind, making ignition unlikely**. If ignition of the natural gas vapors occurs, **the gas does not burn rapidly like gasoline, but forms a slow burning flame that burns back to the source of the natural gas vapor, until the fire is extinguished or the fuel is exhausted.**

**Their terrorism impact is ridiculous – tankers aren’t an effective target**

**Melhem et al ‘6 – PHD Professor of Structural Engineering**

[Dr. G. A. Melhem, Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Dr. S. Saraf “Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths” updated 2006, http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf]

**Let us examine the issue of possible LNG explosion when the liquid and vapor are not confined.** First, LNG has to be vaporized and then mixed in the right proportions with air in order to obtain a composition that can burn. Furthermore, methane is relatively insensitive to initiation as compared to heavier hydrocarbons. Available data and good understanding of explosion dynamics indicate that it is not possible to detonate LNG vapors, even with the use of an explosive charge (that is large enough) on a storage tank, unless the LNG vapors contain high fractions of ethane and propane (more than 20%). Explosion test data on methane/ethane mixtures in the vapor phase support these statements1. **The likelihood of this scenario is equivalent to each of the authors of this paper winning the power ball or megabucks lottery several times, simultaneously. The most likely outcome of a terrorist attack will be a large pool fire and possibly a low order deflagration/flash fire** of finely divided LNG liquid droplets aerosolized by the blast force of the explosive charge. **LNG pool fire hazards are localized and as a result thermal radiation effects** (2nd degree burns) **are typically confined to within one or two pool diameters from the edge of the flame. This significantly limits the extent of impact. As a result, LNG tankers and bulk storage tanks are not attractive targets for terrorists who seek to achieve mass casualties.**

**Tankers aren’t terrorist targets and the impact will be limited**

**Melhem et al ‘6 – PHD Professor of Structural Engineering**

[Dr. G. A. Melhem, Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Dr. S. Saraf “Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths” updated 2006, http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf]

Myth No. 2

**LNG tankers and land based facilities are vulnerable to terrorism;** An LNG potential disaster (explosion of an LNG tanker) is greater today because of the threat of terrorism. The gigantic quantity of energy stored in huge cryogenic tanks is what makes LNG a desirable terrorist target. Tankers may be physically attacked in a variety of ways to destroy their cargo or used as weapons against coastal targets.

Fact

As discussed earlier, **LNG ships are not attractive “mass casualties” terrorist targets. Any explosive charge used on an LNG ship will cause immediate ignition of the LNG vapors. The subsequent LNG pool fire will have a potentially significant impact on the immediate release area only. This will significantly limit the extent of impact.** There are also new Coast Guard security regulations (33 CFR Part 105) for LNG tanker movements and terminals. In addition, IMO and the USCG have established stringent security requirements for vessels in international and United States waters.

**No risk of successful LNG terror attack**

**Avila, ‘2**

[Wanda, Business Writer, “The Tide Rises for LNG”, March/April, Electric Perspectives, Edison Electric Institute, Online]

But **could a terrorist act ruin this safety record**? Beale doesn't think so, **even if terrorists were able to bring a boat loaded with explosives alongside an LNG ship, as they did with the USS Cole**. "An LNG tanker is not like a crude oil tanker," Beale says. "**An LNG tanker is a double-hulled ship, and it has separate storage tanks for LNG. A terrorist would have to penetrate three surfaces. Even after penetrating the third surface, he would be penetrating only 20 percent of the cargo**." Beale admits that an attacked LNG ship would cause a large fire immediately adjacent to the ship, but he asserted that **the fire itself would not endanger people on shore**. "You would not want to be on a ship during a terrorist attack," he says, "but **any distance away from the ship the public would be safe**."

# 2NC

### 1NC – AT: Russia war (empirics)

#### No Russian war or adventurism – empirics

Barnett 11 – chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Debunking the 'Russia Threat' Hype”, 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9771/the-new-rules-debunking-the-russia-threat-hype, CMR

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I was completing my doctoral dissertation on Warsaw Pact-Third World relations. I immediately understood that my time in Soviet studies was done. Why? Because I knew that Russia was full of brilliant political scientists who, once free to pursue their craft free of ideological constraints, would do a better job explaining things there than outsiders could. The generation of Russian scholars that emerged in the post-Soviet era proved me right, and none has consistently impressed more than Dmitri Trenin, who heads up the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Trenin, born a mere three years after Josef Stalin's passing in 1953, has just put out a brilliant book entitled, "Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story." In it, he adeptly explores and, better yet, measures the profound ideological distance between the Soviet Empire we once knew and the post-imperial Russia we struggle to understand today. In the eyes of some U.S. national security experts, "Resurgent Russia" remains nearly as dangerous and imperialistic today as it did two decades ago. That misperception is due in large part to our world's growing multipolarity, which allows Moscow to economize its threat projection. All the Kremlin needs to do today is slap down tiny Georgia or shut down a gas pipeline to Europe, and without fail, the trope of the menacing Russian bear gets recycled in media coverage the West over. By contrast, Trenin's calm analysis provides us the historical perspective we so desperately need, with a hint of it coming in the book's opening dedication, which is to Trenin's eldest son, 30 years old, whom he describes as being "of Russia's first free generation." Think about that for a second. Trenin's son was born in 1981, meaning he was just coming of age when the Soviet Union finally gave up its ghost in 1991. The two decades that followed, despite the generally noncoercive authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin since 2000, represent the single freest period of political and economic life in Russia's long tortured history. We may see a Russian bear that hasn't changed all that much. But for Russians themselves, the reality is that the private sphere has vastly overtaken the public sphere since Moscow "simply shook off its empire." As Trenin notes, that is nothing less than amazing. Trenin readily admits that Russia is not yet a true democracy. Instead, for the first time in modern history, we have a Russia that just wants to be Russia, and not an imperial project. We in the West have been so busy of late debating whether or not America possesses an "empire" that we have neglected to appreciate just how peacefully Russia managed to divest itself of its own real-world version. But Trenin's real intent in this book is to explore what Russia, without an empire, has really become. Our preferred narrative is that U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher defeated the Soviet Union and won the Cold War. But Trenin reminds us that Russia was never defeated in the manner of Germany and Japan in World War II. Nor has it buried itself in regional integration schemes like post-imperial France or married itself to the U.S. as a junior partner in the manner of post-imperial Britain. Instead, Moscow itself initiated the collapse of its empire, beginning with its decision to progressively walk away from its Third World allies starting in the early 1980s and continuing through its stunning decision roughly a decade later to let Eastern Europe simply shift toward the Western camp. Combined, that essentially amounted to accepting the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. In each instance, Moscow had the force necessary to continue the fight for quite a while longer; it simply chose, pre-emptively, not to. What Boris Yeltsin suggested next was simply too visionary for the West to accept -- namely, Russia's intention to join NATO and economically integrate itself with Europe. Instead, NATO and the European Union admitted Eastern Europe into the Western alliance, while offering Moscow merely a relationship with the Western alliance. And lest we forget, Vladimir Putin basically asked to join both organizations again early in the last decade, receiving the same negative reply. After all Russia had unilaterally done to end the Cold War, Europe went out of its way to deny Moscow any sense of belonging. Meanwhile, America moved in militarily from the south as part of its global war on terror, and China progressively encroached -- in an economic sense -- on Russia's "near abroad" in Central Asia. To Moscow's credit, Trenin notes, it has not moved toward any remilitarization of its relationship with the outside world. If anything, the military reform movement begun in 2008 signals Moscow's near-complete abandonment of the field of great-power warfare, save for a nuclear deterrent that it nonetheless continues to reduce in agreement with the United States, the one power it truly fears. In sum, in looking back on these 20 post-Soviet years, it is stunning how little trouble Moscow has fomented in the world, all while engineering arguably the greatest military demobilization in human history, going from more than 200 army divisions to less than 100 brigades. Compared to America's vigorous military build-up and long slate of overseas military interventions since 1990, Russia's record of militarism appears downright negligible by comparison. Representing just 2 percent of the world's population and 2 percent of the world's GDP, "modern" Russia remains a great power of sorts thanks to its sheer landmass and central location. It is a "swing state," Trenin notes, between East and West, as well as between the South and a North that looks increasingly to the Arctic Circle for future energy needs. And yet, as Trenin so trenchantly puts it, in today's Russia, "the elite rule, but they do not lead, and do not care to." Thus the world faces an only partially modernized Russia, where a premodern tsarist political system matches up poorly with a postmodern ideological sensibility in which the private sphere soundly trumps the public sphere -- for better and worse. Modernity's missing link here is political pluralism, but for now, those instincts lie fundamentally dormant in Russia, even as the bulk of the populace recognizes the eventual need for them. Russia basically admits what China must officially still deny: Democracy must eventually come, but there is no shortage of problems to tackle in the meantime. From the perspective of this former Soviet expert, it's hard to see how we could have asked for more in the limited time frame since the end of the Cold War. Russia plans no wars with either Europe or "rising" China, with whom it has generated a true strategic partnership, and Moscow welcomes the rising influence of Turkey and India to its south. Yes, Russia is effectively shut out of Europe for the first time in three centuries, but it seeks no territorial conquest, only soft domination of the sort America pursues throughout much of the planet. All that, with the only cost being the admittedly bloody dissolution of the Balkans and some nasty guerrilla warfare in the Caucasus. In other words, America and the world have had it pretty good since the Cold War's end. Our Russian experts don't make this case well enough. But Russia's Russian experts do.

### 1NC – AT: Nuclear terror (tech)

#### No nuclear terror – tech

Chapman 12

(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, <http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html>)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

### 1NC – AT: Nuclear terror (purchasing)

#### They can’t purchase bombs

Rusling 10 Matthew Rusling; Feb. 17 2010; “Nuclear or biological attack on U.S. unlikely: experts;” Xinhua English News http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-02/17/c\_13177523.htm RMJ

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16 (Xinhua) -- A nuclear or biological attack by terrorists on the United States is the country's greatest threat, but that is unlikely to happen, experts said. In a recent CNN interview, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a militant group like al-Qaida were the biggest threat to the UnitedStates. "The biggest nightmare that many of us have is that one of these terrorist member organizations within this syndicate of terror will get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction," she said. Clinton said al-Qaida remained "unfortunately a very committed,clever, diabolical group of terrorists who are always looking for weaknesses and openings." But while the threat is a horrific one, it is also one of the least likely to occur, experts said. For one thing, it is difficult for a non-state entity like al-Qaida -- and most countries, for that matter -- to build a deployable nuclear device, said Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical intelligence at global intelligence company Stratfor. Some states have access to universities, teams of scientists, huge facilities and large state budgets all aimed at creating a nuclear weapon, and even still those countries have difficulty in producing a usable weapon, he said. Purchasing a weapon of mass destruction would also be extremely difficult for militant groups, as the United States spends hefty sums -- around 1 billion dollars per year -- to track and buy fissile material in a bid to keep it off the market, he said. And if nuclear weapons-grade material were on the market, a number of nations would scramble to get their hands on it, creating heated competition, he said. As for U.S. attempts to protect the country from such a threat, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency have placed a high priority on the issue. "It's hard to determine if they are doing enough," he said. "There's only so much realistically you can do and always more could be done, but they have placed a great deal of resources into it."

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:20)

#### The CCP has meticulously planned Chinese growth to account for slowdowns, but they require exports to buttress their economy – declining demand in the US and Europe forces them to Latin America – that’s Holland.

#### 

#### Exports are key to the economy – downturn collapses the CCP’s hold on power which causes nuclear lashout and global draw-in. That outweighs on magnitude. CCP irrationality and the perceptive nature of the internal link mean we win timeframe: you can only die once.

#### Independently, they conceded the economy impact in the Buzan and Foot ev – Chinese slowdown collapses global growth which turns the case:

Economic slowdown incentivizes Chinese aggression to counterbalance US naval deployment in the South China Sea which distracts from alternate US commitments and undermines unipolarity. Loose nuclear weapons collapse the nuclear taboo which takes away the US’s ultimate backstop against conflict. Chinese aggression towards Taiwan collapses the credibility of US security commitments which turns soft power. Chinese slowdown independently takes away a huge source of Cuban revenue and tech by collapsing Sino-Cuban trade which eliminates the resources for Cuban ethanol production.

### 2NC – Turns Cuban econ (reforms)

#### Turns and solves Cuban transition – Chinese investment ensures reforms

Hearn 12 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba,” http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496)

Sino-Cuban cooperation is indeed driven by a political strategy, but it is focused less on undermining the United States than on the longterm (and less newsworthy) goal of upgrading and coordinating Cuba’s industrial capacities. Although Chinese “assistance” to Cuba is managed through governmental channels, it has been accompanied by advice from Beijing about the benefits of incorporating a greater degree of private initiative into the existing state-led system. Under the leadership of Raúl Castro since 2008, the Cuban government has begun to heed this advice as it seeks to open the island’s economy in a controlled manner. The next section examines recent advances in Sino-Cuban cooperation, including bilateral efforts to plan the latter’s industrial evolution and implement market reforms. These developments suggest that the Cuban government is distancing itself from Fidel Castro’s 50-year-long rejection of capitalism, and moreover, that China is committed to guiding the Western hemisphere’s only communist nation toward reconciliation with international conventions.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:55)

#### Latin American imports are finite and carefully calibrated to play to the strengths of a variety of trade partners. The aff swings the pendulum away from China, decreasing their exports to Latin America and hurting their economy – that’s Holland.

#### Their “not zero sum” arguments don’t assume the nuance of the link – we agree that trade and relations are not zero sum, but the aff’s [relations/multilat] advantage proves they substantially bolster the US’s regional influence by overcoming decades of perceived colonial paternalism.

#### That signal of reconciliation shifts regional consumption patterns away from Chinese goods – that’s Ellis. Proximity incentivizes states to purchase from the US as long as they no longer fear American manipulation of their markets

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### Empirics prove that trade credibility, not net trade, is the determining factor in market choices – Latin America will gravitate towards the US regardless of actual market competition

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – AT: “Influence” high (retime)

#### US credibility is declining – even if they win that we’ve signed some trade deals, their ev doesn’t describe and compare trends of US and Chinese engagement holistically:

#### 1) Controversies prove – Snowden and spying destroyed US cred and encouraged economic counterbalancing which empowered anti-Capitalist groups who spun the US as imperialist. That caused Latin America to turn towards other trade powers in protest.

#### 2) Their ev cites rhetoric, not action – that’s not sufficient to trigger the DA

Padgett 5/27

[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME “Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America” WLRN – South Florida 5/27/13 <http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america>]

There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas.¶ “No it’s not,” he says. “President Obama’s trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show America’s interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America.”¶ Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere “matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.”

#### 3) Security focus collapses economic engagement – the plan reverses that

Fossett 5/28

(Katelyn, “In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to Economy,” Interpress Service News, [www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/](http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/))

Development’s Achilles heel¶ Still, for a country like Mexico that is still struggling with issues of citizen security and rampant crime, many suggest that economic growth would have to start from the bottom, with more robust social programmes and safety nets, before the international community becomes too optimistic about economic and trade booms.¶ Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center, calls Latin America “far behind” in developing policies that might leverage inclusive growth.¶ “There is not a sense of shared responsibility … when your social policy is remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted,” she told reporters on Friday. The region, she said, needs “a widespread recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government … [and] institutions.”¶ In a telephone interview with IPS, she noted that the U.S. relationship with Central America is likely to remain more focused on security concerns.¶ “There is a growing consensus in the development community that sustainable growth can’t and will not happen unless levels of violence are brought under control,” she told IPS.¶ The World Bank recently called citizen insecurity the “Achilles’ heel of development” in Latin America.¶ Members of the U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico.¶ “The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going to solve itself,” Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an advocacy group, said in a statement.¶ “As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and defend human rights in Mexico.”¶ In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry that stressed that “[t]he human rights crisis will not improve until there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexico’s security forces, and more government agents held responsible for the human rights violations they commit.”¶ Even as the focus of U.S.-Mexico relations turns to economics, there is no broad agreement on how exactly a shift toward trade relations will strengthen the “economic competitiveness” of both countries.¶ “Part of the challenge is that we have this term, but we have a laundry list of issues that could fit into that term,” the Mexico Institute’s Chris Wilson said.¶ “What we still don’t have is a coherent agenda or a way in which the leadership from the top level can engage the public or business community or civil society … and create something more [meaningful],” he told IPS.

#### US engagement is low and influence in LA is fading- failure of convergence and growing influence of other countries, esp. China

Hakim 1/6

(Peter, InterAmerican Dialogue, 1/6/14, “The Future of Inter-American Relations”, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3475>, ddy)

In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, there emerged for a time what appeared to be a relatively wide agreement in the United States and much of Latin America regarding the direction hemispheric relations should take. The convergence focused on renewed efforts to achieve inter- American cooperation and integration along three axes—economic, political, and institutional. Most nations welcomed the 1990 proposal of President George H.W. Bush to build toward an integrated economic bloc, a hemisphere-wide trade area that would allow for the free flow of capital and goods among all the countries of the Americas. The new bloc, later named the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), was intended to improve the competitiveness of the hemisphere’s economies, and enable them to keep up with the economically integrated nations of the European Union and with Japan and the fast growing “tigers” of East Asia. The increasingly market-oriented Latin American economies had begun to unilaterally reduce their trade barriers, and saw the value of joining a regional free trade arrangement effectively led by the United States. Second, the idea that democracy was the only valid form of government was taking firm root across the Americas. Free and fair elections were widely accepted as the only legitimate way to secure power. By 1991, every country in Latin America except for Cuba could boast an elected government. Moreover, the hemisphere’s governments approved Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions requiring collective action to protect and strengthen democratic governance in all nations of the Americas. This commitment to collective responsibility was subsequently codified in 2001, when every country of the hemisphere (except Cuba) signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC). Third, the OAS was seen as providing the crucial institutional framework for regional governance and cooperation. It was supplemented in 1994 by the newly launched Summit of the Americas process, which was designed to regularly assemble the hemisphere’s heads of state. This three-pronged convergence, which represented more of an aspiration than a firm commitment from the governments, has mostly evaporated. Negotiations toward a hemispheric trade bloc were halted in 2005 after several years of limited progress, largely because the United States and Brazil could not find common ground on several key issues. The Democratic Charter has hardly ever been invoked, despite many notorious violations of democratic practice. And, after many setbacks, the OAS and Summit of the Americas are both weakened institutions. Today, there is a lack of anything near a consensus on hemispheric relations. Diminishing Ties Between Latin America and the United States The United States and Latin America have been drifting apart for a decade or more. Still, the United States remains the most important external economic presence in Latin America—even though it has been steadily losing ground to Europe and China, which is now the leading commercial partner of several Latin American countries. The United States is the first or second largest trade partner for nearly every country in the region. No other nation invests more in Latin America, transfers more technology, or is the source of more remittances and overseas aid (although the latter is focused mainly on public security and drug-related issues). While its relative economic significance will continue to diminish in the coming period, the United States will surely sustain a robust commercial and financial relationship with Latin America. U.S. political engagement in Latin America has suffered a faster decline. Washington no longer has much influence on most issues and decisions in the region, particularly in South America. U.S. capacity to shape the region’s agenda or affect specific decisions has diminished considerably—and its interest in doing so has shrunk as well. Washington has sharply reduced its involvement in conflict and crisis resolution in Latin America, both within or between countries. The Latin Americans themselves have taken on these tasks, often making use of new regional and sub-regional institutions in which neither the United States nor Canada participate. The United States today has no unifying vision or common approach to Latin America. U.S. policy is largely directed to Mexico and Central America, driven by geographical proximity, economic and demographic integration, and concerns about security and drug trafficking. Brazil—because of its size, economic potential, and regional and global influence—also commands U.S. attention. The two countries, however, have not identified any clear path toward a closer, more cooperative relationship, either political or economic. Diverging Trajectories in Latin America Economically, Latin America has divided itself into two blocs. One includes the eleven countries that have free trade agreements with the United States, virtually all of which are seeking even stronger U.S. commercial ties. The other bloc consists of the five members of Mercosur and two aspirants. Nearly all of them enjoy substantial economic relations with the United States, but few have shown much interest in developing more formal commercial ties. There is currently no overlap between the two blocs. Of twenty Latin American countries, only Haiti and Cuba belong to neither. Regional politics are even more divisive. Among Latin American countries, there is no agreement on (a) what norms have to be satisfied for a government to be considered democratic; (b) what should be viewed as a violation of democratic practice, to be corrected and possibly sanctioned; (c) how persistent violators should be dealt with; (d) who should be the judge of whether violations are taking place; and (e) what role the OAS should play in preventing, judging, and responding to violations. Other trends are also evident. Perhaps the most important is Brazil’s assumption of a more active and important regional leadership role, particularly in South America—although it does not yet appear fully comfortable in that role or certain of its objectives. Venezuela is in a transition. During the Chávez years, the Venezuelan government was time and again a disruptive force in inter-American relations. The new government of Nicolás Maduro remains hostile to the United States, but Venezuela’s significance in the post- Chávez era is in question. Latin American countries are diversifying and strengthening their ties outside the Western Hemisphere. China’s presence is expanding almost everywhere in Latin America, including countries that still do not officially recognize the Beijing government. Chinese trade, investment, and land purchases have all exploded in the last ten years, particularly in commodity exporting nations. It is reasonable to expect growing political influence in the region as well, even as the Chinese government has insisted on its only limited interest beyond economics and commerce. Looking Ahead The critical question, however, is not where inter-American relations stand today, but where they are headed in the coming decades. What follows are four possible scenarios for the evolution of hemispheric affairs. They should not be viewed as predictions. Indeed, the most likely outcome is probably some unexpected combination of several of the scenarios. Scenario I: The Drift Continues The most likely scenario is that inter-American relations remain on their present course. The United States continues gradually to disengage politically from most of the region. Economic relations expand with many countries, but the U.S. share of total trade and investments keeps falling as China and other extra-hemispheric nations increase their share. Reflecting evolving political forces, social changes, and national aspirations, hemispheric ties may become less structured and perhaps less coherent. Relations among the countries of Latin America could become more tense and divisive. For the United States, the scenario involves increasingly selective engagement, directed to specific issues, countries, and events—without much attention to developing a broader strategy for U.S. relations with Latin America. U.S. interest in issues of regional scope will continue to recede. U.S. engagement remains strong only in Mexico and Central America, but even there it will be less intrusive as the countries become more independent and assertive. Latin America’s foreign relations grow increasingly diverse as globalization opens up new opportunities and weakens hemispheric ties. Within Latin America, countries continue to diverge and disagree; in some cases their differences may intensify in the absence of a significant U.S. presence. The distancing of the United States and Latin America combined with the divisions within the region will likely continue to diminish the importance of the OAS and Summits of the Americas. Scenario II: A Return to the Pan-American Vision With Chávez gone, the anti-U.S. alliance, ALBA, loses what is left of its drive, direction, and determination. Venezuela faces deeper political and economic challenges and no longer has the money or unity to play much of international role. No effective replacement for Chávez and Venezuelan resources emerge, and what is left of extreme opposition to U.S. engagement in Latin America fades in importance. There is broad movement towards the center—regarding relations with the United States and political and economic issues generally. This shift may already be occurring in many countries and should lead to an easing of tension and division between Atlantic and Pacific nations, and between North and South American countries. Most Latin American countries increasingly adopt orthodox macroeconomic policies, their economies become more closely aligned, and they expand attention to issues of equality and social justice. The continued emergence and strengthening of the middle class helps to sustain a pragmatic centrism in most countries, and allows for an increasingly shared understanding of democratic principles and the rule of law. Mexico and Brazil recognize the value of closer bilateral ties and more regional and global cooperation. For its part, Brazil—whose differences with the United States have frustrated hemispheric economic integration efforts— becomes increasingly concerned about its long-term economic prospects. It recognizes the Mercosur trade bloc as mainly consisting of unstable, economically hobbled partners. Brazil is also painfully aware that other Latin American nations (Peru, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico) show greater dynamism and brighter economic futures than the Mercosur group. If U.S. negotiations with Europe and Asia are successful in creating new trade agreements, Brazil knows that its global competitiveness will shrink further. Meanwhile, its expanding middle class presses for faster growth and improved government performance. All of these factors should push Brazil toward greater economic pragmatism and openness, and toward stronger commercial ties with the United States and the higher performing Latin American nations. The appeal of the Pan-American vision increases as the United States decisively emerges from slow growth and high unemployment, and manages to overcome its current political hyper-polarization. A more prosperous and unified U.S. modifies policies that have long caused friction with Latin America in the past, including Washington’s approaches to drugs, immigration, and Cuba. The United States is viewed as a more responsible and more respectful neighbor. In this scenario, hemispheric economic cooperation becomes more viable, perhaps opening the way for resumed negotiations toward a hemispheric free trade arrangement. The OAS takes on a more forceful role in regional affairs, and progress toward economic integration allows enhanced political cooperation. Scenario III: Latin American Solidarity Exactly as in the previous scenario, a broad movement towards the center leads to improved relations among Latin American nations. Most Latin American governments pursue similar economic and social policies, solid (not spectacular) growth rates are attained across the region, middle classes the future of inter-American relations continue to expand, and a shared understanding of democratic practice emerges. The left and right extremes are rarely able to win elections. Latin America’s two giants, Mexico and Brazil, recognize the value of closer economic ties, and greater international coordination. During this period of Latin American convergence around centrist politics and economics, the United States remains unable to regain an adequate trajectory of economic growth, the country’s politics remain dysfunctional, and it finds itself overextended internationally. After conservative triumphs in presidential and congressional elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020, immigration legislation becomes more restrictive and exclusionary, harsher sanctions are imposed on a post-Castro Cuba, and U.S. policy in Latin America focuses mostly on drug and security issues and trade disputes. Under this scenario, political and diplomatic relations remain cordial but the United States’ importance in the region declines sharply. The United States no longer plays a major role in regional affairs. Conflicts between countries or crises within them are addressed by Latin American governments. The United States remains an important economic partner for many nations in Latin America, although a weak U.S. economy leads Latin America to focus increasing attention on other trade partners and investors. The OAS and Summits lose most of their role in hemispheric affairs. Latin American institutions take on many of their responsibilities. Scenario IV: A Hostile Relationship There remains a possibility that Latin American nations could become increasingly hostile or antagonistic toward the United States. Some variant of the anti-U.S. sentiment promoted by Hugo Chávez could take hold in a significant number of countries in the region. Developments in the United States would be the same as those outlined in the previous scenario—a continuing U.S. economic slump combined with highly polarized politics and increasingly isolationist foreign policies. At the same time, Venezuela and Argentina unexpectedly rebound from their economic setbacks, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner takes firm control of Argentina politics, and Maduro or a Chavista successor does the same in Venezuela. Brazil and Mexico, along with several other countries, enter a period of slow or zero growth again, leaving both their low-income populations and what had been expanding middle classes vulnerable and frustrated. Populist, authoritarian leaders win elections in many countries. Although extensive economic ties remain in place, neither the United States nor Latin America retains much interest in collaborating with the other. Regional organizations, like the OAS and the Summits of the Americas become moribund, if they survive at all. Some Final Observations Interestingly, of the four scenarios, only the last (by far, the least likely) would necessarily be damaging to long-term U.S. interests, and probably to Latin American interests as well. The Pan-American scenario (Scenario II) is most appealing—in part because we are long accustomed to hearing it portrayed as an ideal model for inter-American relations, but also because it would likely lead to most productive outcomes for both the United States and most countries of the region. But the factors responsible for the already attenuated U.S.-Latin American relationship may have sunk any prospects of a return to the Pan-American framework, at least anytime soon. Since neither the United States nor the countries of the region seem willing to do very much at this point to rebuild vibrant, collaborative relations the best that is hoped is a continuation of some form of selective engagement (see Scenario I). This allows for countries, including the United States, to choose the partners and allies with which it wants to work, and establish appropriate distance from others. It does mean, however, that there will be only limited commitment to any common set of norms or hemispheric institutions. Latin American solidarity (Scenario III) should not be considered a particularly intolerable outcome, particularly if it leads to improved and more constructive relations among the countries of Latin America, and enables them to develop joint approaches to critical domestic, regional, and international issues and needed institutional arrangements to put them into practice. The United States and Latin America might even benefit from a period of disengagement—rather than trying to sustain what has increasingly become, at least for most countries, a largely empty rhetoric of partnership and community.

### 2NC – Soft balancing turn (overview) (0:40)

#### Regionalism is emerging as the outlet for international cooperation – the US will exercise a more limited role and devolve the resolution of international problems to regional powers – that’s Srinivasan. This is vastly more effective than multilateral approaches which makes it offense for us – we’re link turning their multilat advantage:

#### a) Regional powers can tailor solutions based on their neighborhood’s unique political conditions. Multilateral one-size-fits-all solutions are diluted by aggressive outsiders and partisanship.

#### b) Multilateralism creates opportunities for countries to soft-balance the US which hamstrings cooperation. American primacy is structurally unsustainable because of rising powers – the US will exercise a limited role in regional institutions, but won’t run the world stage. 1NC Mazzar indicates rising powers want to “frustrate the leading power’s design” – multilateral approaches give countries like North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela the incentive and capability to disrupt perceived US “meddling” because multilateral deliberation is “one country, one vote.” The US will inevitably overreach and get slammed when it brings up climate talks or nonproliferation at the UN but can approach those issues seriously in more exclusive negotiations.

Pouliot ev = best example of the kind of wishful thinking their scholars promote –he assumes multilat produces effective deliberation and then impacts it but doesn’t identify the causal chain leading to that. They have no ev the plan is sufficient, just that it’s necessary.

Dickerson feeds into the type of scholarly bias our Mazarr ev criticizes – CX proves they’re going from lifting the embargo to solving Kashmir conflict but can’t explain that internal link with anything besides handwaving vagueness. Be very skeptical of an impact framing question with no terminal impact.

### 2NC – Ext. hard power alt cause

#### Hard power forces militarily weak nations to soft-balance which breaks down consensus and collapses effective multilateralism – that’s Layne.

All their ev speaks to unilateral militarism and interventionist policies – the plan doesn’t overturn any of those – if they’re sufficient to prevent effective multilat, alt causes o/w – drone militarism, Libya, and the NSA prove. If they’re not, then multilat has to be compartmentalized, so the failure of warming and human rights treaties proves it’s ineffective.

#### It overshadows the aff’s benevolent signal

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 68

Doubtless, American primacy has its dimension of benevolence, but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there is no such animal. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them—and for good reason. In today's world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in America's favor and the purposes for which it may be used. After all,"Nogreat power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a greatdeal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such bythem. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, butthey are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by theexistence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised." While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible. Others must worry constantly that ifU.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of power in America's hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states's ecurity, and Washington's ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power.

#### Channels of multilateralism can only limit power

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “Soft Balancing Against the United States” International Security

Traditional realists may be tempted to dismiss soft balancing as ineffective. They should not. In the long run, soft balancing could also shift relative power between major powers and the United States and lay the groundwork to enable hard balancing if the major powers come to believe this is necessary. Preventing Soft Balancing in the Future The Bush strategy of preventive war against rogue states and aggressive unilateral military policies in general are increasing the incentives for major powers to balance against the United States. Since 2002, scholars, journalists, and diplomats have witnessed the result: a profound change in the world's response to American power. They have seen not simply the reluctance of traditional allies to join the U.S. war effort against Iraq, but active efforts by many of the world's major powers to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. war plans and reduce the number of countries that would fight alongside the United States. Although some observers might have thought that major powers would easily mend fences with the United States after the conquest of Iraq, in fact there are signs of growing soft balancing against it. Perhaps the most important indicator concerns U.S. allies. Key countries that sided with the United States during the war are working with France and Germany in a manner that works against further U.S. military adventures. Following the March 2004 election, Spain's newly elected prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, declared, "I want Europe to see us again as pro-European. The war in Iraq has been a disaster and the occupation continues to be a great disaster. Spain is going to see eye to eye with Europe again. Spain is going to be more pro-Europe than ever." n67 In September 2003 the United Kingdom joined France and Germany in an effort independent of the United States to use diplomacy and economic statecraft to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear ambitions. In February 2005 these European efforts compelled the Bush administration to declare that it would not use force against Iran "at this point in time" and to support a multilateral approach to the issue, at least temporarily.n68 Such widespread opposition is virtually unprecedented in U.S. history, especially by European and other major powers allied with the United States since World War II. The world is pushing back in response to the Bush administration's strategy of aggressive unilateralism. For the first time, the United States has adopted a national strategy to conquer countries that are not attacking it or its allies, at a time of its choosing, whether other states agree with U.S. policies or not. That Iraq and most other announced possible targets of this preventive war strategy are important to the control of Persian Gulf oil only makes matters worse. That the Bush strategy simultaneously calls for other aggressive unilateral military policies that will increase U.S. nuclear advantages over major powers indicates the administration's lack of concern about a backlash from these states. Serious opposition to U.S. military policies is only likely to increase if the United States continues along its present course of aggressive unilateralism. Traditional hard balancing -- military buildups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents -- may not occur soon in today's world, dominated as it is by the United States' overwhelming military power. But states can dilute the U.S. advantage and contain the United States' power in other ways. Even without directly confronting U.S. military might, major powers can use soft balancing tools -- international institutions, economic statecraft, and ad hoc diplomatic arrangements -- to limit the use of U.S. power in the short term and establish the crucial conditions for more ambitious balancing efforts in the long term.

#### Rising states will “leash slip” despite offered olive branches

Christoper Layne Fall, 2006 “The Unipolar Illussion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment” International Security 31.2 (2006) 7-41

The United States' hard power poses a nonexistential (or soft) threat to others' autonomy and interests. By acquiring the capability to act independent of the United States in the realm of security, however, other states can slip free of the hegemon's leash-like grip and gain the leverage needed to compel the [End Page 29] United States to respect their foreign policy interests. As Posen writes, other major states are expected "at a minimum [to] act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the U.S. and will try to carve out the ability to act autonomously should it become necessary." 81 Leash-slipping is not traditional hard balancing because it is not explicitly directed at countering an existential U.S. threat. At the same time, it is a form of insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion. 82 As Robert Art puts it, a state adopting a leash-slipping strategy "does not fear an increased threat to its physical security from another rising state; rather it is concerned about the adverse effects of that state's rise on its general position, both political and economic, in the international arena. This concern also may, but need not, include a worry that the rising state could cause security problems in the future, although not necessarily war." 83 If successful, leash-slipping would result in the creation of new poles of power in the international system, thereby restoring multipolarity and bringing U.S. hegemony to an end.

### 2NC – Ext. soft balancing I/L

#### Their internal link takes foreign cooperation for granted – instead, 1NC Mazarr indicates small states will consciously undercut US programs via soft-balancing. Their legitimacy scenario might take shape but won’t produce a durable impact.

Their Ikenberry and Kupchan ev proves the link – it’s in the context of how integrating the US into the rule based international system it created is good because it allows us to rely more on allies – there’s no internal link tho bc allies we need cooperate w/ us regardless of things like Guantanamo and the embargo. Kupchan asserts that absent shows of benigness, hegemony just divides the world, but the idea that noko would reunite with soko post plan is absurd – they have no mechanism for remedying that divide which is fundamentally economic, based on things like the northsouth gap, religious differences, etc.

#### Consensus-based models empower weaker states to exploit US commitments and undermine American initiatives

Daniel Pitcairn · November 2012. “Public Opinion and Soft Balancing within the Transatlantic Alliance,” YALE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, <http://yris.yira.org/essays/830>

The better argument for why one should look within international institutions to find evidence of soft balancing derives from Ikenberry’s theoretical explanation for institutionalizing power when a state becomes the leading power in the aftermath of a major war. Ikenberry argues that, after achieving victory in World War II and persuasively becoming the leading state in the international system, the United States engaged in a revolutionary process of institutionalizing its power and values within the Bretton Woods institutions, the UN, NATO, etc. While a hegemon would normally want to bind other states to rules and institutions while remaining free itself, Ikenberry explains that in current conditions, “to get the willing participation and compliance of other states, the leading state must offer to limit its own autonomy and ability to exercise power arbitrarily” within institutions.[3] The other or secondary states have a strong interest in complying and participating because they fear domination by unbridled hegemonic power; international institutions reduce this threat. On the other side of the equation, a leading state like the United States has a strong interest in constraining itself within the institutions and rules it establishes in order to obtain the compliance and participation of secondary states because doing so conserves American power. Ikenberry argues, “the creation of basic ordering institutions is a form of hegemonic investment in the future. If the right types of rules and institutions become entrenched, they can continue to work in favor of the leading state even as its relative material capabilities decline.”[4] However, secondary states are particularly likely to soft balance against the US within international institutions because such institutions artificially increase their power relative to that of the United States. For example, NATO requires consensus among member states for significant strategic decisions, meaning that relatively weaker states like Belgium and Luxembourg are greatly empowered. By voluntarily constraining itself within international institutions, the United States empowered secondary states to counter or constrain (i.e. soft balance) US initiatives.

#### Their ev doesn’t assume the turn – prefer newest, broadest studies

Chaka Ferguson, Florida International University, 3-28-2011. “Soft Power as the New Norm: How the Chinese- Russian Strategic Partnership (Soft) Balances American Hegemony in an Era of Unipolarity,” <http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1449&context=etd>

Analytically, the study has sought to develop a robust definition and methodological framework to determine whether soft balancing is occurring in a specific instance. The definition provided in this study has gone further than those found in the existing literature by rethinking norms as a capability.519 Re-conceptualizing norms (or soft power) along these lines distinguishes hard balancing from soft balancing. Instead of trying to increase relative strength through internal arms buildups or alliances, states faced with overwhelming hard power can develop and increase their soft power assets to restrain a superpower. Such a strategy is much more cost effective than costly internal balancing and less perilous than risky alliances. Furthermore, soft balancing is unlikely to draw the “focused enmity” of the reigning hegemon, which reduces the potential for defections. For these reasons, soft balancing (whether acknowledged or not by the balancers) is the ideal strategy for states that are not currently worried about physical attack by a hegemonic power, but rather are looking for ways to counter the objectives and preferences of the hegemon. Making hard and soft balancing analytically distinct also will help policymakers and scholars avoid possible misperception in international politics. Because of its indirect nature, soft balancing could easily be overlooked. In fact, some scholars argue that there is little or no evidence for the concept. I argue the opposite and demonstrate the necessity of analytically distinguishing between hard and soft balancing. If soft and hard forms of balancing are not kept distinct, there is the possibility of misinterpretation of behavior. For example, actions by China and Russia to counterbalance norms might be underestimated and dismissed because they are indirect and therefore difficult to perceive or quantify. On the other hand, conflating all forms of balancing into the traditional variety could lead to an overestimation of Chinese and Russian motives and capabilities, leading to unnecessary confrontation, escalating tensions and spiraling security dilemmas.

### 2NC – Ext. regionalism alternative

#### Regionalism solves the terminal impacts to every part of the aff:

It increases latin American stability via strong socialist trade groups like alba and Petrocaribe which can prosper without US institutions. Regional agreements are empirically more effective at restricting cbw use and terrorism – things like the the p5+1 deal with iran to restrict its weapons development programs, new start with Russia, etc. all prove that solutions to international problems can be most effectively managed on a local or bilateral level. Their bryan 1 ev doesn’t’ even make an internal link claim between instability and bioweapons – it just says countries are vulnerable to bioweapons. You’re theoretically correct, but you’ve provided no ev as to how

#### And it’s coming now – Srinivasan indicates countries are turning towards bilateral arrangements to mitigate regional problems. TTIP, dispute resolution mechanisms like APEC, the OAS, and NAFTA prove regionalism is an effective way to fill the US power vacuum.

#### Multilateral involvement hinders the movement towards regionalism and doesn’t stabilize US decline

Michael J. Mazarr, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College, "The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 35 n. 4, Fall 2012, p. 12-13.

Global strategies and specific military plans lose credibility. As the leading power is overtaken by others, if it refuses to prioritize and attempts instead to uphold all its commitments equally, the credibility of its regional plans, postures, and threats is destined to erode. Recent literature on credibility argues that it is not based merely on past actions, but from an adversary’s calculations of the current power capabilities at a state’s disposal. When Hitler’s Germany was considering whether to take seriously the pledges and commitments of the Western allies, for example, he paid much more attention to their existing capabilities, their current national will, and the perceived feasibility of their strategic posture than to reputations formed over years or decades of actions. Indeed, such judgments seem to derive not from a checklist of a rival’s defense programs or military actions, but from a much more diffuse and visceral sense of the trajectory of a state’s power relative to its current posture.¶ What is now clear is that the consensus of such perceptions is shifting decisively against the tenability of the existing U.S. paradigm of global power projection. It is, in fact, natural for rising challengers to see weakness in the leading power’s capacities as a by-product of the growing self-confidence and faith in their own abilities. There is already abundant evidence of such perceptual shifts in the assertive leaders and elites of rising powers today, who while respecting continuing U.S. strengths and expecting the United States to remain the primus inter pares for decades to come, perhaps indefinitely nonetheless see current U.S. global commitments as excessive for a debt-ridden and ‘‘declining’’ power.¶ In China, as a leading example, senior officials and influential analysts view the United States as troubled, overextended, and increasingly unable to fulfill its defense paradigm. They believe that the United States will continue as a global power, but expect it to be in a different guise. Conversations with business, government, and military officials from burgeoning powers such as India, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia produce the same broad theme: Structural trends in economics, politics, and military affairs are undermining the degree of American predominance and the sustainability of the existing paradigm of U.S. influence. A leading theme is a growing belief in the social and economic decay of the U.S. model and the inability of the U.S. political system to address major issues. Recent polls and studies of opinion in emerging powers come to many of the same conclusions.¶ These perceptions will be fed and nurtured by parallel actions and trends which will undercut the viability of the existing paradigm. Critics at home are already suggesting that the United States will be unable to sustain the demands of its ‘‘strategic tilt to Asia’’ given planned budget cuts, or meet the requirements of both Middle East and Asian contingencies. As the United States is forced to pursue cost-saving measures, such as cancellations of major weapons systems or troop reductions from key regions, the sense of a paradigm in free-fall will accelerate. We see this already in the recommendations in many reports, even those arguing for a general promotion of forward deployment, for a reduction if not elimination of the U.S. force presence in Europe.¶ In addition to a loss of global credibility, a paradigm in crisis also threatens the credibility of specific U.S. military and foreign policy doctrines. When concepts and doctrines flow from stressed conventional-wisdom worldviews, those concepts and doctrines begin to take on the air of empty rhetoric. A good parallel was the British ‘‘two-power’’ doctrine (the notion that the Royal Navy should match the world’s next two best fleets combined), which eventually became a form of self-reassurance without strategic significance. After a certain point, Aaron Friedberg explains, ‘‘official analyses of Britain’s position took on an air of incompleteness and unreality.’’ One can begin to sense this tendency in some recent U.S. conceptual statements, such as AirSea Battle: from all the public evidence, this concept appears to respond to growing challenges to U.S.

# 1NR

### Cp

### 2NC Condo Good

**Counter-interp—1 CP**

**Garners all offense dispo does**

**Advocacy Construction—contradictory worlds force defense of the middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—key to neg flex, prevents ideological extremism and solves advocacy skills**

**Argument Innovation—debaters are risk-averse—a back-up strategy allows introduction of new positions—forces strategic thinking and smart coverage decisions—solves breadth and research skills**

**Skew inevitable—DAs and T—perms skew worse**

**Judge is a Referee—theory has a huge time trade-off—they have the last speech—unless we make debate impossible, vote neg—Potential abuse not a voter**

### PT

### PTX

### Instab

#### Don’t esc – 2 reasons

**Hotspots don’t escalate – the term existential threat has been overused – yes actors can face a bunch of threats but they have not isolated a clear bar in the 2ac about what constitutes escalation – they need to isolate specific risks to specific countries to access escalation – they clearly haven’t done that – that’s drenzer**

#### military overstretch not a problem—cheap by historic standards, no incentive to balance

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 49.

#### US military power unmatched and resilient

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

**The status quo solves all AFF offense—risk of gradualism DA outweighs slight timeframe deficit**

**Reforms cause Obama change Cuba policy and gradually ease out the embargo—that’s Swieg**

**Framing**

**A) No timeframe distinction argument in the 2AC—no new 1ar distinctions**

**B) Their internal links are predicated on increased trade—the embargo is gradually being shifted out ensuring that there will be sufficient trade to sustain their economy—solves their internal links**

**C) Default to hyper recent uniqueness—their doesn’t assume Mariel, the handshake, currency changes, etc**

**Embargo lift inevitable**

**Handshake proves**

**McCluskey 12/20** (Can a handshake warm US-Cuba ties? Molly McCluskey Last updated: 20 Dec 2013 <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/can-handshake-warm-us-cuba-ties-20131220104312767573.html> nkj)

Hello. Goodbye. Thank you. It's a deal. A handshake can mean many things, but when President Barack Obama greeted Cuban President Raul Castro at the memorial service for Nelson Mandela in South Africa, the handshake reverberated around the world, leading critics and optimists alike to wonder if a new age of US-Cuba relations had arrived.

The idea wasn't entirely unfounded. Speaking at a fundraiser for the Cuban-American National Foundation in November, Obama said the current US policy toward Cuba "doesn't make sense".

"It's a losing battle trying to keep up this policy that hasn't produced anything tangible in a half a century. It's just a matter of time before the policy changes," said Colonel Morris Davis, a Howard Law professor and Air Force veteran who served as the chief prosecutor at the Guantanamo Bay detention center in Cuba from 2005-2007. "I viewed the handshake in a positive light that maybe it's the beginning of the thaw that has been delayed for far too long."

**Timeframe is 3 years**

**Huddleston 12/18** (BY VICKI HUDDLESTON Ambassador Vicki Huddleston is a former chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (1999-2002) and former deputy assistant secretary for Africa at State and at Defense. She is retired from government service.

<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/12/18/3826241/obama-castro-handshake-what-does.html#storylink=cpy> nkj)

The now famous — or infamous depending on your point of view — handshake between Presidents Obama and Castro at Nelson Mandela’s memorial may simply fade into history, as did the Bill Clinton/Fidel Castro handshake, or it could become the symbol of a beginning. A beginning that with courage and trust on both sides could lead to normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations at least by the end of Obama’s term.

**Democratic shift, Florida demographics, embargo failure—prefer conclusive evidence**

**Ediger 12** 9/19/12 – (Don, “Cuba Post-Castro Future” Masters from the University of Southern California and a writer for Consortium News with background at the Sacramento Master Club, Consortium News is a peer-reviewed and edited News service with reviewers from the Associated Press and Newsweek, Available online @ http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/19/cubas-post-castro-future/)

With Fidel Castro now 86 and his brother Raul at 81, big changes appear inevitable in Cuba over the next few years. Cuban-Americans are ramping up investment plans, assuming the U.S. government will finally lift the embargo. But the future may not be all that’s expected, reports Don Ediger.¶ By Don Ediger¶ For more than 50 years, Cuban-Americans have been looking for ways to end the Castro regime. Today their plans are being re-shaped in ways that would have been all but unthinkable only a few years ago – and these plans will be affected by the outcome of U.S. presidential elections.¶ Most Cuban-Americans now believe that a transition to democracy may require a period of many years. In the meantime, a growing number of them are exploring ways to profit from a country that has been off limits for most American companies.¶ Cuban leader Fidel Castro speaking at the Jose Marti Monument in 2003. (Photo credit: Ricardo Stuckert/ABr.)¶ The key to this new strategy is an option that until recently wasn’t even open to discussion – ending the U.S. embargo. That is more likely to happen, Cuba experts say, if Barack Obama is reelected, because Democrats are traditionally more open to options regarding the embargo. There’s also growing doubt about whether outlawing Cuban imports actually hurts the regime.¶ “Personally, I think that the embargo is a completely failed policy,” says Miami attorney Antonio Zamora, referring to the 50-year-old law that was imposed after the Castro regime expropriated private property. In all those years, Zamora points out, only a few property owners have ever been compensated.¶ Though largely overlooked by the media, major shifts in Florida demographics make repeal of the embargo much more likely. Numbering more than one million, Cuban-Americans have been the largest Hispanic group in Florida, and for many years they overwhelmingly favored keeping the embargo in place. To win elections in Florida – the country’s largest swing state – politicians of both parties have traditionally promised to uphold the embargo for fear of alienating Cuban voters.¶ Now that’s changing. Hispanics from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Mexico and other Latin American countries are growing faster in numbers than those from Cuba. And while Cuban-Americans are mostly Republicans, others in Florida are heavily Democratic.¶ Moreover, Cuban-Americans themselves are changing their mind about the embargo. According to a recent study by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University (FIU), most Cuban-Americans in Miami would agree with Zamora that the embargo hasn’t worked well. In fact, 47 percent would like to see the embargo lifted.¶ “This is probably the first presidential election in which Cuba is not a top issue for the Cuban-American community,” says Andy Gomez, senior fellow at the University of Miami’s Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. A member of Mitt Romney’s staff phoned Gomez last year to get his advice on the topics that Romney should address when he visits Miami. Gomez’s answer wasn’t Cuba but jobs and the economy.¶ It’s not that Cuban-Americans are no longer interested in Cuba, Gomez says, but that they are “tired of the same thing over and over again.”¶ There’s a growing consensus among Cuban-Americans that lifting the embargo won’t help the Castros retain power – as some once thought – because the regime has been thoroughly entrenched for more than five decades. When Fidel Castro became ill six years ago, some experts thought the end was near, but today they discuss a variety of scenarios.¶ As Jose Gabilondo of FIU’s Cuban Research Institute explains it: “The logic of the U.S. embargo is ‘Let’s create conditions of civil unrest in Cuba by creating conditions of economic hardship such that there will be a popular uprising that will lead to a revolution.’ I reject that approach. I don’t think it makes sense.”¶ The other approach, Gabilondo says, “is to realize that transition is already happening in Cuba – slowly, and one deal at a time.”¶ A Vietnam-Style Scenario¶ The most likely scenario, many experts believe, is for Cuba to follow a path similar to Vietnam’s – continuing as an authoritarian socialist state but also opening up trade with the United States.¶ Several Cuban-American groups are already gearing up for this possibility, which comes with the prospect of huge profits for American companies once the embargo is lifted. There’s also a sentiment in the community that opening up trade might also provide the Cuban government with an incentive to be less repressive.¶

#### Reject UQ that doesn’t assume oil discoveries which changes calculations

Franks ‘8

Jeff Franks – Havana correspondent for Reuter’s – New York Times – 6/12/2008¶ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html?\_r=0

Sometime next year, Cuba plans to begin drilling a major oil field off its northern coast that might do what little else has done - bring change to U.S-Cuba relations.¶ In a rare confluence of circumstances - including a new leader in Havana and a new one coming to the United States, as well as record-high crude oil prices - a new petroleum source could grease the wheels for the two longtime foes to reunite out of mutual need, experts say.¶ Getting there would require a sea change in U.S. policy, namely altering the U.S. trade embargo imposed against Cuba in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro's Communist government.¶ If the embargo remains as is, a nearby source of oil will be off limits to the United States, and the American oil industry will miss out on billions of dollars of business.¶ Opponents of the embargo rule out any change until President George W. Bush, who has toughened the embargo, leaves office next year.¶ Even then they can expect a fight from influential Cuban-American leaders, who argue that helping Cuba produce oil will aid the Cuban government and undermine the 46-year-old embargo's reason for being.¶ "We think what really needs to happen in Cuba is for that system to change," U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, who was born in Cuba, told Reuters.¶ But opponents of the embargo say the combination of economics, energy needs and environmental concerns, as well as new leaders in the two countries, make easing the embargo possible.¶ "The pro-embargo status quo is really threatened right now," said Sarah Stephens, director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas. "The sands are running out of the clock on the policy and I think that has the pro-embargo folks worried."¶ The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated the Cuban field holds at least five billion barrels of recoverable oil and 10 trillion cubic feet, or 280 billion cubic meters, of natural gas.¶ In a few years, Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil a day, enough to make it energy independent and perhaps even an oil exporter, said Jorge Piñón, a former oil company executive who is now a researcher at the University of Miami. Cuba currently consumes 145,000 barrels of oil daily, of which 92,000 barrels come from Venezuela, though that would most certainly rise if the embargo were lifted.¶ The government has sold oil concessions to seven companies and has said a consortium of Spanish, Indian and Norwegian companies will drill the first production well in the first half of 2009.¶ Drilling was supposed to begin this year and has been put off twice because of undisclosed factors that U.S. experts said most likely included difficulty getting a rig because global drilling activity was high, the need for more facilities to handle the oil and possible effects of the U.S. embargo.¶ The Cuban field lies as much as six miles, or 9.7 kilometers, below the sea surface, depths at which U.S. production technology is superior, said a Cuban oil expert, Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.¶ "Cuba and none of the present partners have that capability without accessing American technology, and therein lies the rub," he said. "U.S. export controls forbid them to transfer that technology to Cuba."¶ Cuba, looking past the United States, has been in talks with Petrobras of Brazil, which has deep-water expertise, about getting involved.¶ The embargo has withstood repeated legislative attempts to loosen its terms, including unsuccessful bills in the U.S. Congress in 2006 to exempt oil companies.¶ But Kirby Jones, a consultant on Cuban business and founder of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association in Washington, and who is against the embargo, said a big Cuba oil find would change the political equation.¶ "This is the first time that maintaining the embargo actually costs the United States something," he said. "And we need oil. We need it from wherever we can get it, and in this case it's 50 miles off our coast."

**Reforms and Diaz-Canel**

\*even if US policy doesn’t change, the status quo provides sufficient precedent to end Helms-Burton – Raul already announced retirement and succession by Diaz-Canel and reforms are going on now – that means the Aff mechanism happens in the long-term, but incrementally and post-reform, which is the key link distinction between engagement now and post the plan

**López-Levy, 4/10** – PhD candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (Arturo, “Getting Ready for Post-Castro Cuba”, The National Interest, 4/10/13, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba-8316)//SJF>

In Cuba, a post-Castro era is looming on the horizon. The Obama administration should muster the political will to prepare the United States for February 2018, when neither Fidel nor Raúl Castro will remain at the helm of the Caribbean island.

In 1960, the year Cuba's new first vice president was born, Fidel Castro had already been ruling Cuba for a year. Neither the Beatles nor the Rolling Stones had conquered rock-n-roll. Dwight D. Eisenhower led the United States, becoming the first of eleven U.S. presidents (including Obama) to apply the failed embargo policy against the Castros and the political project they represent.

But against the calendar, there are no victories. In 2006, Fidel Castro's illness forced the first transition in the Cuban leadership since 1959. Raúl, then age 76, replaced Fidel, who was almost 80. Despite the fact that it was a succession between brothers of the same generation, the presidency of Raúl Castro has had important consequences. Faced with the loss of Fidel's charismatic leadership, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) began economic reform and political liberalization. It was an effort to rebuild their capacity to govern under the new conditions.

In the last five years, the Cuban government has created an important institutional foundation for a parallel transition to a mixed economy (symbolized by the encouragement of non-state-sector firms) and a post-totalitarian relationship between the state and civil society (symbolized by relaxed travel restrictions).

With the election of a new Council of State in February, the last phase of the transition to the post-Castro era began. Raúl Castro was reelected to the presidency, and for the first time a leader born after 1959, Miguel Díaz-Canel, became his second in command. Although this gradual transition is unfolding with the same party and president in power, one can begin to discern a new leadership and changing priorities.

Looking at the Communist Party as a corporation (an analogy that should not be abused), Díaz-Canel is a manager who has served at various levels of the production chain. He worked at its foundation, as a university teacher and youth leader. Later, in the strategic provinces of Villa Clara and Holguin, he administered the implementation of economic reforms and directed the opening of the economy to foreign investment and tourism—all while maintaining party control over both processes.

Díaz-Canel is part of the network of provincial party czars who are important in the implementation of the proposed changes, particularly decentralization. Having worked in central and eastern Cuba, the new first vice president has cordial ties with regional commanders of the armed forces—the other pillar, along with the Communist Party, of the current Cuban system. He is a civilian, the first in the line of succession to have little military experience. But he is steeped in the networks of power and well versed in carefully managing reform.

Challenges for Cuban Leaders

If Cuba implements the type of mixed economy proposed by the last Congress of the Communist Party—a new, more vital relationship with its diaspora and the world—it may also experience a political transformation. As the economy and society change, the political status quo cannot hold. The rise of market mechanisms and an autonomous non-state sector will reinforce the newly open flows of information, investment and technology. These new sectors will seek representation in the political arena. Citizens will have greater access to the Internet, and will be able to associate more horizontally.

For at least the next five years, this does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy. But economic liberalization will force an expansion of the current system. Economic and migration opportunities will channel some of the energy in the direction of new businesses and travel, but it will not be enough. The party system will be reformed in order to remain at the helm of social and economic life. Political liberalization will probably start in the lower rungs of government, allowing citizens to vent their frustrations at that level. Raúl Castro’s decision to limit leadership positions to two terms, at a time when the older generation is leaving power by attrition, will result in a more institutionalized leadership that promotes younger leaders in an orderly fashion.

Time for Presidential Action

In this new context, the United States should open a path for those regime voices who have an interest in backing more serious reforms. Washington should weaken the naysayers within the Cuban elites by showing what Cuba can gain through opening up. This requires a U.S. willingness to test Havana with real incentives in ways it has not done since the Ford and Carter Administrations.

Washington's current strategy—ignoring Raúl Castro's promarket moves and using USAID regime-change programs to meddle in Cuba's domestic politics—is yielding diminishing returns. The United States would gain more by allowing its own business community to trade and invest in the emerging Cuban non-state sector and beginning a limited engagement with the new leaders in Havana. A dynamic Cuban market would whet corporate appetites and put the U.S. embargo against the island in jeopardy. This vision lines up with the criticism of Cold War-era U.S. Cuba policy expressed in the past by President Obama and his new secretaries of state and defense, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel.

The opportunity to redesign U.S. policy towards Cuba will not last forever. A failure to respond to Raúl Castro’s overtures for negotiation with Washington would be a strategic mistake. Unfortunately, the 1996 Helms-Burton law codified the embargo as a legislative act, limiting presidential authority to terminate sanctions in response to changing conditions. But President Obama still can make a significant difference in bilateral relations if he decided to lead on the issue by using his prerogative as a diplomat-in-chief.

Lifting the embargo won’t help the economy—Castro will squander money

Jorge, 2000 (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

#### Under the real world of Castroism, however, the answer must be a terse one: none. The embargo has not harmed the Cuban economy. Cooperation between the United States and Cuba would have been impossible from the very beginning of the Revolution for legal, political, ideological, strategic, and economic reasons, not to mention others of a philosophical or moral character. In other words, it was in the past, and continues to be at present, contrary to the United States’ national interest and to its fundamental foreign policy orientation and objectives to lift the embargo under Castro’s conditions: that is, without a firm commitment to the political democratization and market reforms that his regime has stubbornly opposed for the last 40 years. However, if, purely for the sake of an intellectual exercise, we were to assume that the embargo had never existed, its nonexistence would have had no effect whatsoever on the Cuban economy. Castro simply would have squandered U.S. instead of Soviet resources. Given Castro’s objectives and policies, the ultimate result for the Cuban economy could not have been any different, regardless of who had financed his Revolution.

#### Uniqueness disproves this

**Legon, 12** – (Elio, “Cuba’s Economy Progressing, Despite Obstacles”, Havana Times, 5/3/12, <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=69060)//AB>

The enemies of the Cuban Revolution never tire of repeating in any and every way they can — even in social networks — that Cuba’s economy is a disaster, the socialist system has been a failure, the revolution has destroyed the economy, etc., etc. All this is a colossal lie. For those people with poor memories, I should remind them that due to US pressure, all of the Latin American countries (with the sole exception of Mexico) broke off relations with Cuba in the 1960’s. Due to that blockade in our own geographic area, Cuba had to develop most of its trade with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. In the case of the East Europeans, this was through the mechanism known as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). These trade relations, being outside the system of capitalist speculation, maintained fair and stable prices for goods – both imported and exported ones. In the case of the Soviet Union, it would buy — at a fair price — all the sugar that Cuba was capable of producing. In addition it offered low-interest loans to finance development projects, in keeping with the economic relations between fraternal countries. These were not like the usurious credits extended by loan sharks like the IMF or the World Bank. They didn’t give us anything, and nor did they subsidize us as is insidiously argued by some, and nor did they exploit us. It was a mutually beneficial relationship. As is widely known, at the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 90’s, Eastern European socialism was destroyed do to a multitude of factors, which aren’t my purpose for discussion here. Subsequently the Soviet Union was dismembered and dragged into capitalism. With the disappearance of those mechanisms for commerce with that geographical area, Cuba found itself practically without foreign trade. The country’s economy was left paralyzed to a great degree and, forced by this circumstance, to begin what was for all Cubans an exceedingly difficult period: the so-called “Special Period.” Many of the enemies of Cuba bet that socialism on the island would disappear, just like it did in Eastern Europe. This was a logical way of thinking for those who were unfamiliar with the Cuban people, their ability to sacrifice and their determination to defend the achievements of the revolution. Any country in the world that would have faced a situation like what Cuba faced would have had huge riots bringing the government down to its knees. However the Cuban people are determined to defend their revolution at the cost of any sacrifice. The United States tightened its blockade with the passage of the Torricelli Act in October 1992, claiming that this would be the coup de grace to the revolution. The main objective of this law was to isolate Cuba from international trade to cause the economy to collapse. Failing to achieve the expected results with the Torricelli Act, in March 1996 Bill Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act. This legislation prohibits Cuba from trading with subsidiaries of US companies in other countries and sanctions foreign businesspeople so that they will not invest or trade with Cuba. This acted in unison with other actions to form a veritable fence around the Cuban economy. Despite all these obstacles and anti-Cuba laws, the economy in Cuba is developing and growing each year. In 2011, the GDP grew at a rate of 2.7 percent and plans for 2012 envisage a growth of 3.4 percent. In Cuba there is no unemployment; rather, there are labor shortages in many areas of the economy. If we compare the Cuban economy with those of the major capitalist countries in the world — which are either in a recession or on the edge of one, with millions of people out of work, with just as many people having lost their homes and many having to live in the streets, where there are large demonstrations in which people are brutally repressed by the police, and where governments are going bankrupt — then we have to ask: Who are the ones who have failed?

#### Funds go to the government—not the economy

Suchlicki ‘13 (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.

### 2NC Link Wall

#### The plan collapses Cuba—that’s Hernandez

**A) Capital flood—foreign capital would cause counter-influences that undermine Raul’s credibility**

**B) Power realignment—political consensus would shatter—hardliners would adopt a conservative approach that sihfts reforms away from the status quo gradual policies**

**C) Framing—There’s a low threshold for a link—Reforms are very delicate and tight—even a tiny link is sufficient to trigger the full DA—that’s Swieg**

#### D) Rapid impact causes collapse

**Erikson, 8** – Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and has an M.A. in Public Policy from Harvard University and a B.A. from Brown University (Daniel P., “The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution”, Bloomsbury Press, 10/28/08, p. 250-251, CB)

Like most of his colleagues, Monreal readily agreed that the United States was the unpredictable eight-hundred pound gorilla with the potential to transform Cuba’s future: “Lifting the embargo would be totally disruptive for Cuba. I don’t know if the impact would be good or bad,” he told me. “You know it’s a mistake to believe that the Cuban government would have the ability and the manpower to manage or control the events that would follow. That is false. Because if the embargo were lifted, it would have such a huge, rapid impact that Cuba – at least the Cuba I know – would not be prepared for the changes it would bring. If you imagine that this is a boxing match, then right now the Cuban boxer is in the United States, but he knows the other guy’s moves and how to protect himself. But what if, all at once, the boxer is put in the ring against fifteen other guys? You’d have the ring crying! And for better or worse, the ability of the Cuban government to control this fight is very limited.”

**Transition must be slow – fast reforms cause failed state status**

**Azel 08 –** (September, “How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers,” José Azel is currently a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research\_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf)

But suppose that the U. S. government and the other constituencies - Cubans in the island and in exile, and the international community - are persuaded that economic changes per se represent an opening that should be rewarded in some fashion. A case in point is the argument that, in the case of Cuba, a very gradual approach to changes is called for in order to avoid the possible chaos resulting from more comprehensive and rapid changes. Cuba’s abysmal set of initial sociopolitical and economic conditions is such that the introduction of comprehensive **massive changes could result in a failed state**. Some may be tempted to dismiss this concern by noting that by some parameters (e.g. the pervasive informal economy, reluctance to participate in formal employment, etc.) Cuba is already a failed state. But technically Cuba is not a failed state.10 It is a stable closed state still able to implement and enforce government policy, albeit not uniformly particularly in economic matters. Therefore **the gradualist argument deserves more serious considerations** as it is always possible for conditions to get worse. The main concern hinges on the precarious balance between openness in a society and stability in that society. It is certainly the case that economic reforms – particularly reforms to begin a transition from a command economy to a market economy – are destabilizing. Decollectivization and desocialization create enormous social dislocations. They require a repositioning of the role of the state and a new model of social relationships between the state and its people. Whatever the specific strategies selected they will demand many difficult choices. As Ian Bremmer points out in “The J Curve,” “for a country that is “stable because it’s closed” to become a country that is “stable because it is open” it must go through a transitional period of dangerous instability.” These are thoughtful security considerations that must be weighted by policymakers. Unfortunately Cuba’s present politico-economic system can not be the starting point for a serious development and reconstruction process. The country’s existing bureaucratic, institutional, and organizational framework is not conducive to the creation of a new state.

Elite factionalism --- elites would be divided some arguing for more change and some for less while the populace demands a rapid influx of US products.

Suchlicki, 2012 (Jaime, professor and director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “Ignore Raúl Castro’s siren song” <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/01/3025115/ignore-raul-castros-siren-song.html>)

#### Raúl’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies of economic centralization and opposition to the U.S. He cannot now reject Fidel’s legacy and move closer to the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms.¶ Raúl is also unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S. At a time when the U.S. is seeking regime change in the Middle East, Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the U.S. and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶

E) Communication and people – plan causes media access and revolutionist ideals that loosens Raul’s control

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

#### Relations with the United States are at a historical nadir, but improving them is not a priority, Alarcón said. In fact, Cuba would be challenged to come up with a good strategy if the next U.S. administration were inclined to improve relations. Raúl should carefully weigh whether and to what degree Cuba should seek better relations with the Americans or respond to a new administration’s decision to permit increased travel to Cuba. Although Cuba ultimately stands to gain access to the U.S. market from a normal bilateral relationship, the potential costs in terms of open flows of communication and people could weaken the government’s control over its population. Weaker U.S. sanctions and a more cordial relationship would also make it harder to scapegoat the United States and would shift the onus for economic and political reform to the Cuban leadership. More critical to Cuba than improved relations with the United States is for it to strengthen its relations with the major developing nations, especially Russia, Mexico, and Brazil Speaking for all those present, Machado Ventura thanked Raúl for his confidence in them and assured him of their absolute loyalty. Raúl could be confident because it was highly unlikely that domestic or international conditions would threaten his hold on power, but in any case¶ he should seek to establish his credibility as a leader on his own terms. One way to do so would be to reinforce the fusion of leadership at the highest levels of the Council of State, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Cuban Communist Party. As for the international community, Cuba could count on Venezuelan oil subsidies in the short term, and in the longer term would have access to substantial new energy reserves from offshore oil and gas and the production of sugarcane ethanol. Raúl should concentrate his international efforts on promoting and diversifying Cuba’s economic relationships. Raúl’s greatest challenge will be the rise in expectations for further reforms among the Cuban population, which could be worsened if the new U.S. administration decides to loosen restrictions on travel and remittances. More contact with relatives and friends will result in demands for better jobs and increased freedoms. Remittances are already creating disparities among Cubans with and without access to hard currency.. Since Cuba cannot move quickly or undertake broad reforms, it should attempt to limit expectations Raúl has been skillful in allowing some social reforms; additional reforms, however, should be undertaken cautiously and with the full support of the Party and the armed forces.

That increase in communication and access makes status squo opposition movements effective --- achieves Cuban Instability

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

#### Participants considered the wide range of actors that constitute the “established opposition” within Cuba today and debated whether these diverse groups could coalesce around a common denominator or vision. Despite the signing of several declarations of unity among leading opposition activists, for the most part the three traditional political fronts— Liberals, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats— being shaped by the most prominent dissident groups continue to pursue their own uncoordinated and often conflicting visions of change. 5 The question of leadership remains a problem, with most opposition groups known for their individual leaders rather than the movements they represent. Such personality-driven activism has had the tendency, many believe, to keep the opposition fractured. Significant efforts have been undertaken to mobilize political opinion, the most well-known being the Varela Project— started in 1998 by Oswaldo Payá of the Christian Liberation Movement and named after Felix Varela, a Cuban religious leader— and its continuation, the Todos Cubanos (All Cubans) program. The Varela Project relied upon Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, which provides for citizens to introduce legislation by petition containing at least 10,000 signatures. The principles of the Varela petition, demanding the rights to free expression and association, amnesty for nonviolent political prisoners, free enterprise, and electoral reforms, were seen as the first steps to create the necessary space for all Cubans to be able to freely participate in economic and political life on the island. The petition was an unprecedented example of successful political organizing and was presented to the National Assembly with a total of 25,404 signatures in 2002 and 2003. The Cuban legislature rejected the petition, and the Assembly’s Constitution and Legal Affairs Committee responded with its own counterinitiative: to amend the Cuban constitution to make the socialist nature of the Cuban state permanent. The government claimed that its own petition met with 99 percent voter approval. To further crush the Varela Project and the dissident movement at large, beginning on March 18, 2003, the Cuban government arrested, summarily tried, and jailed seventy-five civil society leaders, including independent journalists, librarians, and trade unionists. In spite of the continued existence of mobilizations such as the Varela Project, participants disagreed in their assessment of the dissident movement’s level of impact within Cuba today. Most agreed that because of the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media and their constant vilification in the state press, few Cubans are likely to recognize the dissident movement as a true symbolic or practical alternative. Some participants felt that international support may be the only thread propping the movement up. Others saw the opposition as a weak but nonetheless substantive movement with significant roots. The key issue confronting participants was whether a dissident-based opposition culture could provide the foundation for an opposition movement, or whether dissident groups in their current form would become less relevant in light of changing political and economic dynamics. In the end, a common concern emerged: with greater economic openings in the offing, more is now at stake for the dissident movement than at perhaps any other moment in its history.

G) Fear and speculation --- Cubans base their economic reforms off of the consequences of the U.S.S.R. --- fear of economic collapse will cause actions to spin out of control

Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” <http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf>)

#### When the U.S.S.R. collapsed and its former allies underwent rapid economic reforms, Cuba took note of the consequences in Russia and Eastern ¶ Europe—rapid price increases and hyper-inflation, high interest rates, and ¶ wide-scale privatization contributing to corruption, allocation of state assets ¶ to crony capitalists and inadequate institutional transparency. By contrast to ¶ the dismaying economic transition of the Soviet countries, Cuban citizens and ¶ policymakers also observed many successes of gradual, experimental approaches ¶ to economic reforms in Communist Vietnam and China.¶ Cubans are now nervous that, as has occurred in other transitioning ¶ societies, suddenly empowered or re-empowered economic groups will seek ¶ to increase their influence in political and economic decision-making. “The ¶ government needs to be careful so this thing doesn’t spin out of control,” ¶ worried one academic who spoke with CDA about the lessons of the Soviet ¶ Union and Eastern Europe. “We need to avoid the same mistakes.”¶ Despite public debates and consultations, they reasonably fear key ¶ decisions are being concentrated in a limited number of hands and will be ¶ implemented too quickly.

#### Too much engagement too fast causes instability—going too fast risks civil war

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [\*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

#### The regime fears fast economic opening as destroying its control

Colomer 2005- Research Professor in Political Science, Professor at the University of Barcelona

(Joseph M., “Who Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective”, 2004-2005, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 163, heinonline)//KW

For the same reason, the worst possible outcome for Cuba would be the one produced by the opposite pairs of choices, embargo-democracy, as seems unnecessary to discuss. Issues may appear regarding Cuban rulers' second and third preferences. The free trade-democracy outcome would give Cuba the benefits of an open economy, but would fatally undermine the present rulers' control-what they call "independence" or "revolution." Actually, even under the present circumstances, and in spite of their claims against the U.S. embargo, Cuban rulers are wary of allowing more foreign investment, tourism, Cuban-Americans' direct cash remittances, and international communications (including the Internet) because they could enable anti- Castro opinion and pressures among Cuban population.

It thus seems realistic to assume that the present Cuban rulers-in other words, Fidel Castro-value the endurance of the revolutionary dictatorship more than the advantages of open trade and investment. While Cuban rulers may dream of a "Chinese way," with foreign trade and investments permitting them to maintain the dictatorship, they would rather maintain the dictatorship even at the cost of the embargo than risk their own position with a democratic opening. Usual slogans, such as "Revolution or death," clearly illustrate this position. A different ordering will be considered later, basically as a hypothetical preference change induced on Cuban rulers by either the further effects of the embargo or their weakened capability to maintain social control.